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ABSTRACT:  We provide an overview of the corporate governance practices of Brazilian 
public companies, based primarily on an extensive 2005 survey of 116 companies.  We 
focus on the 88 responding "Brazilian private firms" which are not majority owned by the 
state or a foreign company.  We identify areas where Brazilian corporate governance is 
relatively strong and weak.  Board independence is an area of weakness:  The boards of 
most Brazilian private firms are comprised entirely or almost entirely of insiders or 
representatives of the controlling family or group.  Many firms have zero independent 
directors.  At the same time, minority shareholder have legal rights to representation on the 
boards of many firms, and this representation is reasonably common.  Financial disclosure 
lags behind world standards.  Only a minority of firms provide a statement of cash flows or 
consolidated financial statements.  However, many provide English language financial 
statements, and an English language version of their website.  Audit committees are 
uncommon, but many Brazilian firms use an alternate approach to ensuring financial 
statement accuracy -- establishing a fiscal board.  A minority of firms provide takeout 
rights to minority shareholders on a sale of control.  Controlling shareholders often use 
shareholders agreements to ensure control. 
 
Keywords:  Brazil, corporate governance, boards of directors, minority shareholders 
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I.  Introduction 
This paper provides an overview of Brazilian corporate governance in 2005, based 
primarily on an extensive survey distributed in January 2005 to all firms listed on Bovespa, 
Brazil's principal stock exchange (2005 Brazil CG Survey).  We received 116 replies to the 
survey, including 88 from privately controlled firms, 17 from government-controlled firms 
and 11 from subsidiaries of foreign companies. 
Our data provide a uniquely detailed snapshot of Brazilian corporate governance.  
Even basic data, such as the number of independent and non-independent directors, was 
previously not available.  The snapshot we took in 2005 was conducted shortly after the end 
of a period from 1995-2003 in which almost no Brazilian firms went public.  The number 
of public companies shrank from 599 in 1998 to 390 in 2004 (of these firms, 358 had 
publicly traded shares).  Since, then, the Brazilian IPO market has dramatically revived, 
with over 100 IPOs, including 64 in 2007.  Most of these IPOs were on Bovespa listing 
level 2 or Novo Mercado, which have higher governance requirements than a traditional 
listing.  This produced an increase in the number of firms with publicly traded shares, from 
the 2004 low of 358 to 449 at year-end 2007.  We are rerunning the survey in 2007, to 
capture these changes and to develop time-series data on how Brazilian governance is 
changing over time. 
This paper proceeds as follows.  In Part II, we briefly review the general literature 
on corporate governance in emerging markets, and provide a more detailed review of 
Brazilian corporate governance.  In Part III we describe our survey, other data sources and 
sample.  Part IV discusses the overall size of the Brazilian public market, and the cross-
listing and Bovespa listing choices made by Brazilian firms.  The remainder of the this 
article concentrates on Brazilian private firms and covers boards of directors (Part V); 
board and committee procedures (Part VI); audit committee, fiscal board and independent 
auditor (Part VII); shareholder meetings and shareholder rights (Part VIII); conflict of 
interest transactions (Part IX); financial disclosure (Part X); control and shareholder 
agreements (Part XI); and compensation (Part XII).  Part XIII concludes. 
II.  Literature Review 
We review here the limited literature on corporate governance patterns in emerging 
markets.  We cover studies of Brazil with care, and other studies in less depth.  We do not 
cover studies of developed countries or nonpublic firms. 
A.  Firm-Level Governance in Emerging Markets 
This paper provides a detailed descriptive analysis of firm-level governance in an 
important emerging market.  We know remarkably little about those details.  Cross-country 
studies of governance often provide high level comparisons between countries -- for 
example, mean scores on disclosure (Patel, Balic and Bwakira, 2002) or overall governance 
(Bruno and Claessens, 2007).  Moreover, these studies rely on a limited set of cross-country 
governance measures.  The available multi-country measures which cover emerging 
markets are: 
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• Standard & Poor's transparency and disclosure survey (conducted in 2002, repeated 
in selected countries but not generally)  -- covers 30 Brazilian companies. 
• Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia governance survey (conducted in 2001, not 
repeated) -- covers 24 Brazilian companies.1 
Individual country studies typically report summary statistics for overall governance 
and particular governance measures (e.g., Zheka, 2007, Ukraine; Drobetz, Schillhofer and 
Zimmerman, 2004, Germany; Black, Love and Rachinsky, 2006, Russia).  Choi, Park and 
Yoo (2007) provide some details on the composition of Korean boards of directors during 
1999-2002.  But there is very little that provides a fine grained picture of a particular 
country.  The only comparable study we know of is a contemporaneous study of India 
(Balasubramanian, Black and Khanna, 2007). 
B.  Research on Brazilian Corporate Governance 
1.  Overall Governance 
We survey here what we consider to be the more significant research on Brazilian 
corporate governance.  Leal (2007) provides a more extensive survey.  Valadares and Leal 
(2000) and Leal, Carvalhal-da-Silva and Valadares (2000) find a high degree of 
concentration of voting power in Brazilian firms. This concentration is due in large part to 
firms using dual-class structures, with insiders retaining voting common shares and 
outsiders holding primarily nonvoting preferred shares. 
Da Silveira, Leal, Carvalhal-da-Silva and Barros (2007) study the evolution of firm-
level corporate governance practices in Brazil from 1998 to 2004 using a broad corporate 
governance index based on publicly available data.  They find that overall governance 
quality improved over this period, but remains low.  There are large differences between 
firms, with greater heterogeneity over time.  They found no significant explanatory factors 
for firms' governance choices. 
Dutra and Saito (2002) study the effect of cumulative voting on board composition 
as of 2000 for the 142 most actively traded Brazilian firms.  They rely on family names to 
identify which directors may be independent.  They find little use of cumulative voting, and 
estimate that about 20% of directors are independent. 
Da Silveira, Barros and Famá (2003) study the association between firm value and 
board size, composition, and separation of Chairman and CEO.  They find a positive 
association between separation of Chairman and CEO and Tobin's q. 
2.  Novo Mercado 
De Carvalho (2000) reviews Brazil's experience during the 1990s and concludes 
that the absence of IPOs, and the decline in trading on Bovespa during the late 1990s, is 
                                                 
1  Baker, Gottesman, Morey and Godridge (2007) report results from an index developed by Alliance 
Bernstein, which includes Brazil (number of firms not stated), but provide too few details on the index 
elements for us to assess its reliability. 
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plausibly related to low investor protection.  This study formed part of the basis for 
Bovespa's creation of Novo Mercado in 2000. 
De Carvalho (2002) discusses the potential value of higher governance listing 
segments of an overall stock market, such as those introduced by Bovespa.  De Carvalho 
and Pennacchi (2007) analyze firms' decisions to go public on, or migrate to, the higher 
Bovespa listing levels, and find evidence of lower IPO underpricing, positive investor share 
price reaction to migration, and higher post-migration liquidity. 
Bovespa's success with higher listing levels has led to efforts to copy its approach 
in, to our knowledge, Turkey and Romania, though thus far with little success (Alexandra, 
2007; Ararat and Yurtoglu, 2007). 
3.  Takeout Rights 
Several papers study takeout rights (also called tag along rights) in Brazil.  Many 
Brazilian firms issue both voting common shares and nonvoting preferred shares, which 
have economic rights similar to common shares.  Prior to 1997, Brazilian corporate law 
required a new controlling shareholder, who acquired 50% of the common shares, to offer 
to buy all remaining common shares, at the same per-share price paid for when acquiring 
control.  In 1997, Brazil removed this rule to facilitate the government's sale of controlling 
stakes in majority state-owned enterprises.  In 2000, the law was changed again, to reinstate 
takeout rights for common shares at 80% of the per-share price paid for the controlling 
shares.  Nenova (2005) and Carvalhal-da-Silva and Subramanyam (2007) report conflicting 
results on how these law changes affected the premium accorded to common shares, 
relative to preferred shares.  Bennedsen, Nielsen and Nielsen (2007), report that during 
2000-2006, a number of Brazilian firms voluntarily agreed to provide additional takeout 
rights to common shareholders, provide takeout rights to preferred shareholders, or both, in 
connection with equity offerings. 
4.  Value of Control 
Dyck and Zingales (2004) study the premium paid for control blocks in 39 
countries; of these, Brazil has the highest average premium, at 65% of the trading value of 
the shares.  Nenova (2003) estimates that Brazil has a relative high value of  control, at 
23% of firm value; values for other countries range up to 48% in South Korea.  See also 
Valadares (2002). 
C.  Overview of Brazilian Corporate Governance 
Historically, Brazilian financial markets were heavily regulated.2  Brazil adopted its 
first Corporations Law only in 1940.  The government ran the stock exchanges.  Brokers 
were civil servants, who had the exclusive right to trade shares on the exchanges, and could 
pass this right on to their children.  Government rules specified the number of brokers in 
each area, as well as brokerage fees. 
                                                 
2 For further discussion of the history of Brazilian corporate law and governance, see Gorga (2006).  
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Some financial liberalization began after a 1964 military coup.  In 1965, the new 
government adopted the first law to regulate capital markets and securities offerings (Law 
4728/65).  The Brazilian securities commission, Comissao de Valores Mobiliarios (CVM), 
was created in 1976 (Law 6385/76).  A new Corporations Law, also enacted in 1976, 
established separate rules for closely held and public corporations (Law 6.404/76).  These 
reforms eliminated the old civil servant brokers and permitted private stock exchanges and 
broker-dealers to emerge. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, the government took several steps to encourage stock 
market development.  It granted tax incentives to firms that went public and to investors 
who purchased shares in public companies, and required pension funds and insurance 
companies to invest a minimum percentage of their assets in the shares of public 
companies.  By the end of the 1980s, there were almost 600 publicly traded companies, but 
a significant number had gone public only to capture the tax incentives, and had no interest 
in having public shareholders or active trading of their shares. 
In the late 1980s, the financial incentives for going public were eliminated; since 
then, many of the firms which went public during the period of tax incentives have returned 
to private ownership.  At the same time, the government partially or fully privatized a 
number of state owned enterprises.  By the end of the 1990s, a large fraction of share 
trading involved shares of privatized companies.  Many large Brazilian firms cross-listed 
on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and a significant portion of trading moved to 
the NYSE.  Privatizations aside, there were almost no IPOs, and the number of public firms 
shrank. 
Meanwhile, in the 1980s, the Rio de Janeiro Stock Exchange collapsed, leaving the 
Sao Paulo Stock Exchange, Bovespa, as the principal share trading market.  The remaining 
exchanges merged into Bovespa in 2000 (Santana, 2007).  The Instituto Brasileiro de 
Governanca Corporativa (Brazilian Institute for Corporate Governance, or IBGC) was 
created in 1995, and released an initial Code on the Best Practices of Corporate Governance 
in 1999.  In 2000, Bovespa launched three new listing segments, Level 1, Level 2 and Novo 
Mercado, with stronger requirements for corporate governance than for a regular Bovespa 
listing (Santana, 2007).  We discuss the market success of these higher listing levels below.  
CVM issued its own Recommendations on Corporate Governance in 2002.  These are pure 
recommendations, there is no "comply or explain" regime, in contrast to a number of other 
countries. 
III.  Survey Methodology and Sample 
A.  Survey Methodology 
This study draws mainly on our early 2005 survey of all Brazilian companies with 
shares listed on Bovespa.  Respondents could complete the survey either in paper form or 
by using a web interface.  The survey was conducted with support from Bovespa, which 
distributed the survey to member firms.  We followed up with each firm through repeated 
phone calls and emails.  We promised confidentiality to all respondents, and thus do not 
 5
name individual firms in this paper.  We received 116 responses, for a response rate of 
32%.3 
B.  Data Sources 
We use several data sources in addition to the survey responses.  The list of publicly 
traded companies is from Bovespa, at www.bovespa.com.br/principal.asp.  Market 
capitalization comes from Bovespa.  Financial data comes from the Brazilian financial 
database Economatica, available at www.economatica.com.  Basic company information 
comes from annual reports, available from the InfoInvest Database at 
www.infoinvest.com.br.  Information on Bovespa listing levels and date comes from 
Bovespa.  Information on cross-listing exchanges, levels, and dates comes from Bank of 
New York, at www.adrbny.com, Citibank, at 
wwss.citissb.com/adr/www/brokers/index.htm, CVM, at www.cvm.gov.br, Deutsche Bank, 
at www.adr.db.com, and JP Morgan, at www.adr.com (we reconciled discrepancies 
between these sources by contacting companies directly). 
C.  Sample Description 
Table 1 provides basic information on all publicly traded Brazilian firms, firms with 
at least somewhat active trading (the firm's shares traded, on average, at least once every 
two weeks), and the firms which responded to the survey.  As of January 2005, Bovespa 
included 358 firms with publicly traded shares.  We sent the survey to all of these firms, 
and received 116 responses (32%), including a 71% response rate from government-
controlled firms, and a 52% response rate from subsidiaries of foreign companies, but only 
a 28% response rate from "Brazilian private firms" (firms without majority government or 
foreign ownership).  However, measured by market capitalization, the response rate for 
Brazilian private firms is much stronger.  By this measure, we capture 61% of the market 
capitalization of Brazilian private firms.  If we limit to actively traded firms, the response 
rate improves, to 38% overall, 34% for Brazilian private firms, and 63% for private firms 
based on market capitalization. 
                                                 
3  The survey (in Portuguese) and an English translation are available from the authors on request. 
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Table 1.  Sample Characteristics:  All Firms and Responding Firms 
Total number of firms and market capitalization for (i) all publicly traded Brazilian firms, (ii) firms with 
active trading (trading on at least 26 days during 2004), and (iii) firms which responded to the 2005 Brazil CG 
Survey, separated into firms with Brazilian private control, state control, and foreign control.  Data is as of 
January 2005.  Exchange rate as of December 31, 2007 is R$1.80 per US$1. 
Number of firms All public firms 
Responding 
firms Percent 
Actively 
traded 
firms 
Responding 
firms Percent 
All firms 358 116 32% 229 87 38% 
private 313 88 28% 194 66 34% 
state 24 17 71% 19 14 74% 
foreign 21 11 52% 16 7 44% 
Market cap (R$ billions)       
All firms 871 441 51% 833 433 52% 
private 557 337 61% 523 332 63% 
state 167 51 31% 165 50 30% 
foreign 147 54 36% 144 51 35% 
It is likely that governance characteristics differ between our three groups of firms -
- Brazilian private firms, government-controlled firms, and subsidiaries of foreign firms.  
We focus in this paper on Brazilian private firms.  The tables below are limited to these 
firms, unless otherwise specified.  We have 88 responses from private firms.  However, two 
firms answered only the first part of the survey.  Thus, for many questions, we have 86 
responses instead of 88.  For particular questions, we also have occasional missing or 
ambiguous responses, these are noted below. 
Table 2 provides a breakdown of Brazilian private firms by market capitalization 
quartile.  The top quartile of firms by size represent 93% of the market capitalization of all 
Brazilian private firms, while the bottom half of firms are quite small and together 
represent only 0.4% of market capitalization.  The largest private firm by market 
capitalization (Vale do Rio Doce) has twice the market value of the entire bottom three 
quartiles.  Many of these firms have very limited trading, and perhaps should not be 
considered as public firms at all. 
Our response rate was substantially higher for actively traded firms, and for larger 
firms.  The response was 41% for the quartile containing the largest private firms.  
Moreover, even within the top quartile, responding firms tended to be larger than 
nonresponding firms.  For example, we received responses from 21 of the 39 firms in the 
top octile of firms.  As a result, responding firms include 61% of the market capitalization 
of all Brazilian private firms.  Measured by market capitalization, then, our sample is 
reasonably representative of the Brazilian stock market. 
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Table 2.  Sample Characteristics:  Brazilian Private Firms, By Size Quartile 
Total number of firms and market capitalization for Brazilian private firms which responded and did not 
respond to the 2005 Brazil CG Survey, divided into quartiles based on market capitalization.  Market 
capitalization is in R$ millions. Data is as of January 2005.  Exchange rate is R$2.62 per US$1. 
Number of firms Market capitalization 
Quartile Size Range 
Total responding 
responding as 
% of quartile
All firms in 
quartile 
% of 
total 
responding 
firms 
responding as 
% of quartile
1 R$ 1,061 to 86,739 78 32 41.0% 515,919 92.6% 322,734 62.4% 
2 R$ 172 to 991 78 24 30.8 35,151 6.3 12.478 35.5 
3 R$20 to 158 78 21 26.9 5,592 0.3 1.666 29.9 
4 R$0 to 19 79 11 13.9 465 0.1 54 11.6 
 Total 313 88 28.1% 557,128 100% 336,933 60.5 
IV.  Listing Levels:  Bovespa and Cross-Listing 
In 2000, Bovespa sought to respond to Brazil's image (and perhaps substance) of 
having poor corporate governance, by creating a family of voluntary listing levels, with 
increasingly strict corporate governance requirements.  This experiment with higher listing 
levels was patterned after the "Neuer Markt," created by Deutsche Borse.  The higher levels 
provided investors with a readily understood signal of their corporate governance posture.  
The Neuer Markt failed and was reabsorbed into the overall Frankfurt exchange.4  In 
contrast, the Bovespa effort, after a slow start, has become a major success.  Bovespa 
listing levels now include "regular" Bovespa, Level 1, Level 2, and Novo Mercado (New 
Market).5 
Many Brazilian firms issue both common shares and nonvoting preferred shares, 
which are similar in their economic rights to nonvoting common shares.  A Novo Mercado 
listing requires, among other things, that the firm issue only voting common shares; have a 
minimum free float (shares not controlled by the controlling shareholders) of 25%; provide 
financial statements which comply with U.S. GAAP or IAS; provide full takeout rights to 
minority shareholders in a transfer of control; and agree that conflicts with shareholders 
will be resolved by arbitration.  Level 2 is similar to Novo Mercado, but allows firms to 
issue preferred shares.  Level 1 is only a small step up from an ordinary listing, and focuses 
on improved disclosure.  New listings must be on Level 1 or higher, with an exception for 
foreign firms which want to cross-list on Bovespa.6  In 2006, Bovespa created Bovespa 
Mais, intended for smaller firms, with somewhat lower listing requirements than Novo 
Mercado, but this level has not yet attracted listings.  An appendix summarizes the Bovespa 
rules for Regular, Level 1, Level 2, and Novo Mercado listings.  
Cross-listing provides another way for Brazilian firms to signal their intent to 
maintain a higher level of disclosure and other corporate governance practices.  Table 3 
summarizes the Bovespa and foreign cross-listing decisions of the responding Brazilian 
private firms at the date of our survey.  Nineteen firms in our sample (22%) have cross-
                                                 
4  For further details, see de Carvalho & Pennacchi (2007). 
5  The full name on Bovespa for Level 1 (2) is Differentiated Level of Corporate Governance 1 (2). 
6  Bovespa Resolution 282.05 (2005), art. 2, ¶ 1. 
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listed their shares.  Most firms which cross-list shares do so only for nonvoting preferred 
shares.  Three firms in our sample are listed on Bovespa Level 2, and two are listed on 
Novo Mercado. 
Table 3.  Listing on Foreign Exchanges and Different Bovespa Levels 
Firms which have common shares, non-voting preferred shares, or both cross-listed on a foreign stock 
exchange.  Sample is 88 Brazilian private firms which responded to the 2005 Brazil CG Survey.  Seven firms 
are listed both on the NYSE and on a non-U.S. exchange. 
Panel A.  FOREIGN CROSS-LISTING 
Type of shares Common Preferred Both Neither 
US cross-listed firms 
(% of firms in sample) 
1 
(1%) 
17 
(18%) 
2 
(2%) 
68 
(78%) 
NYSE 1 15 2 -- 
Level 3 0 5 2 -- 
Level 2 1 10 0 -- 
Level 1 (OTC) 0 1 0 -- 
Level 4 (Portal) 0 0 0 -- 
non-U.S. listing 0 6 1 -- 
Panel B.  BOVESPA LISTING LEVEL 
 Regular Level 1 Level 2 Novo Mercado TOTAL 
Bovespa level 66 17 3 2 88 
Table 3 offers a snapshot of cross-listing and Bovespa listing in the first half of 
2005.  But this picture has been changing rapidly.  From 1995-2003, there were only six 
initial public offerings by Brazilian firms -- an average of less than one per year.  The 
number of IPOs then soared to 7 in 2004; 9 in 2005, 26 in 2006, and 64 in 2007.  Of these 
106 IPOs, 75 were on Novo Mercado, 15 on Level 2, 8 on Level 1, and 8 (all cross-listed 
firms) had a regular listing.  The ANBID (Association of Brazilian investment banks) bars 
member firms from participating in an offering unless the firm is listed on Level 1 or 
higher; there is an exception for cross-listed firms, which are not eligible for Level 1 or 
higher listing levels.7  In addition, 16 older firms have upgraded their governance to meet 
the Level 2 or Novo Mercado requirements.  Only 4 of the newly public firms were cross-
listed in the U.S. on level 2 or 3 (all level 2 listings on the NYSE)..  Another 23 of these 
firms have cross-listed in the U.S. on level 4 (Rule 144A) and 2 firms have cross-listed on 
level 1. 
Thus, a time series picture of cross-listing and Bovespa listing level choices is 
valuable.  Table 4 provides this picture.  It shows the number of Brazilian public firms -- 
whether in our sample or not -- which are cross-listed in the U.S., their cross-listing level, 
how many are cross-listed on foreign exchanges, and how many are listed on different 
Bovespa levels, from 2000 through the first half of 2007.8  The data on number of listed 
                                                 
7  The ANBID regulation is available at www.anbid.com.br. 
8  As Table 3 indicates, some Brazilian firms have cross-listed common shares, some have cross-listed 
preferred shares, and some have cross-listed both types of shares.  If a firm has shares cross-listed on more 
than one level, we report the highest listing level, based on regulatory stringency (level 3 > level 2 > level 1 > 
level 4). 
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firms includes firms which have publicly listed debt but not equity, and thus is not directly 
comparable to the numbers in Table 1. 
Table 4 also indicates the number of Brazilian firms which are cross-listed in the 
United States at the end of each year from 1995 on.  The number of firms listed on the New 
York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ grows steadily through 2002 and then levels off.  It is 
probably not a coincidence that the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), which applies to these 
firms, was adopted in 2002.  Another factor in recent cross-listing decisions is likely 
Brazilian firms' ability to signal their corporate governance by listing on Novo Mercado or 
on Level 2.  This could reduce the value of the additional signal provided by a level-2 or 
level-3 cross-listing.9 
A large number of Brazilian firms are also cross-listed on level 1 (over the counter) 
or level 4 (Rule 144A).  There is continued growth in the number of these cross-listings, 
principally on level 4.  Level 4 and most level 1 cross-listed firms are not subject to SOX. 
Table 4.  Listing Decisions Over Time:  Cross-listing and Bovespa level 
Number of Brazilian public companies which are cross-listed outside Brazil (principally in the U.S.) and 
listed on the indicated Bovespa levels.  Some firms with a regular Bovespa listing have public debt but not 
public equity.  Data is provided by Bovespa, and is at year-end except for 2007. 
 Foreign cross-listing Bovespa listing 
Year NYSE or 
NASDAQ 
U.S. (total 
cross-listings ) Regular level 1 level 2 
Novo 
Mercado Total 
1995 2 23 577 577 
1996 3 35 589 589 
1997 7 39 595 595 
1998 17 53 599 599 
1999 19 56 534 
these levels were created in 2000 
534 
2000 22 60 494 0 0 0 494 
2001 26 66 450 18 0 0 468 
2002 33 72 407 24 3 2 436 
2003 34 72 374 31 3 2 410 
2004 35 76 343 33 7 7 390 
2005 35 79 316 37 10 18 381 
2006 32 82 300 36 14 44 394 
2007 33 95 293 40 18 82 433 
V.  Boards of Directors 
A.  Board Size 
The board of directors is a central aspect of every firm's corporate governance.  
Brazilian corporate law requires public companies to have a board of directors, with at least 
three members.10  However, both CVM and IBGC recommend 5-9 member boards.  Firms 
                                                 
9  In Table 4, we show cross-listing in the U.S. but not in other countries.  Relatively few Brazilian firms 
cross-list in other countries; of these, all but one (Bradespar, cross-listed in Madrid) also cross-list in the U.S. 
10  Law 6404/76, arts. 138 § 2, 140.  Closely held companies do not need to have a board of directors. 
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that list on Bovespa Level 2 or Novo Mercado must have at least 5 member boards.11  In 
practice, most firms have relatively small boards.  Table 5 shows the breakdown.  Over 
two-thirds of the responding firms have boards with between 3 and 7 board members, with 
a mean of 6.8 and a median of 6 members. Only five firms (6%) have more than 11 
directors. 
Table 5.  Size of the Board of Directors 
Board size and percentage for 88 Brazilian private firms which responded to the 2005 Brazil CG Survey. 
Minimum board size under Brazilian law is 3 directors. 
No. of Directors No. of firms percentage cumulative percentage 
3 14 16% 16% 
4 3 3% 19% 
5 19 22% 41% 
6 11 13% 53% 
7 15 17% 70% 
8 6 7% 77% 
9 4 5% 82% 
10 4 5% 86% 
11 7 8% 94% 
12-15 4 5% 96% 
22 1 1% 100% 
mean (median) 6.8  (6) 
Table 6 divides Brazilian private firms into quartiles based on market capitalization.  
Not surprisingly, the largest firms have larger boards.  However, once we move below the 
first size quartile, board size is similar regardless of firm size.  The 32 firms in the first 
quartile include all five firms with large boards (more than 11 members), but only one of 
the 14 firms with only 3 directors. 
Table 6.  Size of the Board of Directors, By Size Quartile 
Board size and percentage for 88 Brazilian private firms which responded to the 2005 Brazil CG Survey. 
Minimum board size under Brazilian law is 3 directors. Quartiles are based on market capitalization as of Jan. 
2005. Amounts in R$ millions. 
Quartile Size Range firms in sample percentage mean median min. max. 
1 R$ 1,061 to 86,739 32 36% 8.59 8 3 22 
2 R$ 172 to 991 24 27% 5.96 6 3 10 
3 R$20 to 158 21 24% 5.57 5 3 11 
4 R$0 to 19 11 13% 5.64 5 3 11 
 Total 88 100% 6.78 6 3 22 
                                                 
11  CVM Recommendations on Corporate Governance (2002), § 2.1; IBGC Code of Best Practice of 
Corporate Governance (2003), § 2.10; Bovespa Level 2 Listing Rules (2006) § 5.3 and Bovespa Novo 
Mercado Listing Rules (2006) §4.3. 
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B.  Board Independence 
Table 7 reports the breakdown of Brazilian boards between independent and non-
independent directors.  In many countries, firms must report this information publicly, or 
else report directors' backgrounds, from which their status can be inferred.  Not so in 
Brazil, however. One can tell from annual reports which directors are also company 
officers. One can sometimes infer from last names which directors represent the controlling 
family, but not always because family members or representatives don't always have the 
same last names.  We asked respondents to use the following definitions: 
• Non-independent directors: are persons who are officers, former officers, or 
members or representatives of a controlling shareholder, shareholder group, or 
family (for example, a director who is an officer of another company controlled by 
the same controlling family, or the personal legal counsel to the controlling family, 
would be considered to be an inside director). 
• Independent directors: are persons who are not officers or former officers and are 
independent of the controlling shareholder, controlling shareholder group, or 
controlling family. 
Beyond requiring disclosure, a number of countries require public companies to 
have a minimum number of independent directors, or else recommend this through a 
"comply or explain" code of corporate governance, under which companies must either 
meet the governance recommendation or explain why not.  The U.K. Combined Code of 
Corporate Governance (Financial Reporting Council, 2006).is the model for the comply or 
explain approach.  Brazil has no legal requirements for board independence   Brazilian 
corporate law specifies that only one-third of board members may be company officers.12  
We follow common practice and refer to persons who are both directors and officers as 
"executive directors", and other directors as "non-executive.”  However, in many Brazilian 
companies, some or all of the non-executive directors represent the controlling family or 
group.  The IBGC Code of Corporate Governance recommends that a majority of the board 
be independent, but this recommendation, our data show, is rarely followed.  CVM 
recommends more vaguely that "as many board members as possible" be independent.  A 
more realistic sense of how Brazilian firms are doing comes from Bovespa's listing rules, 
under which firms that want to list on Bovespa Level 2 or the Novo Mercado must have 
20% independent directors.  This means either one or two independent directors, depending 
on board size.13 
Table 7 shows the numbers and fractions of independent directors for the 80 
Brazilian private firms which provided this information in their survey responses (8 firms 
did not respond to these questions).  By international standards, Brazilian firms have very 
few independent directors. Over a third of the responding firms with data on board 
                                                 
12  Law 6404/76, art. 143, § 1. 
13 CVM Recommendations on Corporate Governance (2002), § 2.1, IBGC Code of Best Practice of Corporate 
Governance (2003) , § 2.12 , Bovespa Level 2 Listing Rules (2006) § 5.3 and Bovespa Novo Mercado Listing 
Rules (2006) § 4.3. 
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composition (28/80) have no independent directors.  Another 18% have only a single 
independent director.  Only 10% have a majority of independent directors. 
Table 7.  Proportion of Independent Directors 
Number and percentage of independent directors, for 80 Brazilian private firms which responded to the 2005 
Brazil CG Survey and provided data on board composition.  In computing proportion of independent 
directors, percentages are rounded up to next whole number. 
No. of 
Independent 
Directors 
number of 
firms 
cumulative 
percent 
Proportion of 
Independent 
Directors 
number of 
firms 
cumulative 
percent 
0 28 35% 0 28 35% 
1 14 53% 1-10% 1 36% 
2 16 73% 11-20% 12 51% 
3 13 89% 21-30% 7 60% 
4 5 94% 31-40% 15 78% 
5 0 94% 41-50% 9 89% 
6 4 99% 51-60% 4 95% 
7 1 100% 61-70% 3 98% 
   71% or more 1 98% 
mean  1.65 mean  0.24 
median  1.00 median  0.20 
total 80  total 80  
The tendency for Brazilian firms to have either no or few independent directors is 
not limited to smaller firms.  Table 8 divides our sample into size quartiles based on market 
capitalization.  Even the largest firms often have no independent directors.  The tendency 
for the smallest quartile of firms to have more independent directors likely reflects sample 
selection bias among the limited number of small firms which responded to the survey. 
Table 8.  Board Independence, By Size Quartile 
Number and percentage of independent directors, by size quartile, for 80 Brazilian private firms which 
responded to the 2005 Brazil CG Survey and provided data on board composition.  Quartiles are based on 
market capitalization as of Jan. 2005. 
  Number of independent directors Percentage 
Size 
Quartile 
firms in 
sample 
No. (%) with zero 
indep. directors mean median max. mean median 
1 30 8  (27%) 2.0 2 6 20 25 
2 21 9 (43%) 1.4 1 6 17 21 
3 18 9  (50%) 1.1 1 4 9 16 
4 11 2  (18%) 2 2 7 40 38 
total 80 28  (35%) 1.65 1 7 24% 20% 
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At the time of our survey, 14 Brazilian firms were listed on Bovespa Level 2 or 
Novo Mercado; of these, six are included in our sample.  These firms are subject to a 
Bovespa requirement of at least 20% independent directors.14 
C. Representatives of Controlling and Minority Shareholders 
Brazilian firms typically issue both voting common shares and non-voting preferred 
shares.  Public Brazilian firms cannot issue U.S.-style preferred shares with fixed 
dividends.  Thus, preferred shares are, in effect, similar to non-voting common shares.  
Until 2001, Brazilian corporate law allowed firms to issue up to 2/3 preferred shares.  In 
2001, the cap on preferred shares was reduced to 50%, but this lower limit applies only to 
firms that go public after 2001.  Firms with preferred shares cannot list on Novo Mercado.15  
Seventy-four firms in our sample (84%) have issued preferred shares. 
Almost all Brazilian firms have a controlling shareholder or group, which owns a 
majority of the common shares.  This shareholder or group choose a majority of the board 
members.  However, under legal rules described below, preferred shareholders or minority 
common shareholders can often elect their own representative(s) to the board.  Table 9 asks 
whether any independent directors represent preferred shareholders, minority common 
shareholders, or both.  The table is limited to the 52 firms with one or more independent 
directors.  Below, we refer to preferred shareholders and minority common shareholders 
together as "minority shareholders." 
Table 9.  Whom Do Independent Directors Represent? 
Number of directors who represent preferred shareholders or minority common shareholders, for 52 Brazilian 
private firms which responded to the 2005 Brazil CG Survey, provided data on board composition, and have 
at least one independent director.  Of these firms, 48 have issued preferred shares. 
  
 Director represents 
Number of 
Directors in 
category 
Preferred 
shareholders Percent 
Minority 
common 
shareholders 
Percent 
Either preferred or 
minority common 
shareholders 
Percent 
none 28 58% 30 58% 19 37% 
1 17 35% 14 27% 16 31% 
2 2 4% 7 14% 13 25% 
3 1 2% 1 2% 3 6% 
4 0 0 0 0 1 2% 
one or more 20 42% 22 42% 33 63% 
Among firms with at least one independent director, 28 firms (42% of firms with 
preferred shares) have a representative of the preferred shareholders in the board; 30 firms 
(42%) have a representative of the minority common shareholders; and 33 firms (63%) 
                                                 
14  Bovespa Level 2 Listing Rules (2006) § 5.3. 
15  Law 6404/76, art. 15, § 2 (2/3 limit), amended by Law No. 10.303 of 2001 (50% limit).  For the 
grandfathering provision, see Law No. 10.303 of 2001, art. 8; Bovespa Novo Mercado Listing Rules (2006), § 
3.1(vi). 
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have a representative of one or both groups of minority shareholders.  Including firms with 
no independent directors, 33/80 (41%) of the responding firms have one or more 
independent directors who represent minority shareholders. 
Under Brazilian law, there are two basic ways that minority shareholders can be 
represented on a company's board of directors.  First, common shareholders holding at least 
10% of the common shares can demand cumulative voting.16  However, cumulative voting 
is not often employed in practice.  Of the 86 firms who responded to this question, 10 
(12%) reported that cumulative voting had been used at least once in the last five years.  
Cumulative voting was used once at four firms, twice at four firms, three times at one firm, 
and in all five years at one firm. 
Second, preferred shareholders, minority common shareholders, or both together, 
can vote separately to elect one representative by majority vote of all shares in the indicated 
group, as follows:17  
• By minority common shareholders, if minority common shares are at least 15% of 
total common shares; 
• By preferred shareholders, if preferred shares are at least 10% of total shares;18 
• By all minority shareholders together, if they hold at least 10% of total shares and 
neither the 15% threshold for common shares nor the 10% threshold for preferred 
shares is met. 
There are no procedures for minority shareholders to inform other shareholders about 
candidates before a meeting, so as a practical matter these rights are available primarily to 
large minority shareholders who can show up at the shareholder meeting, nominate a 
director, and cast a sufficient number of votes to elect this person.  In addition to these 
formal rights, the controlling shareholder can include a representative of the minority on the 
main list of candidates. 
We turn next to a more detailed look at the non-independent directors.  The first two 
columns of Table 10 show the number of non-independent directors at each firm.  A large 
majority of firms has 3 or more non-independent directors.  The remaining columns of 
Table 10 show the number of non-independent directors who are officers or former officers, 
the number who are not officers but represent the controlling shareholder, and the number 
who also sit on the boards of one or more related firms.  These related firms could be either 
public or private.  Perhaps due in part to the legal requirement that officers cannot be more 
than 1/3 of the overall board, most firms have only one or two officers or former officers on 
their board; some have none.  Altogether, only 23 of the 88 respondents (26%) have three 
or more directors in this category. 
                                                 
16 Law 6404/76, art. 141, caput. 
17 Law 6404/76 art. 141, § 4-5, as amended  by Law 10.303/2001.  These rights are available only to 
shareholders who have held shares continuously for the 3 months preceding the meeting. 
18Through 2006, the controlling shareholder could require the preferred shareholders to choose their 
representative from a list of three persons proposed by the controlling shareholder.  Law 10.303/ 2001, art. 8, 
§ 4. 
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If most directors are not independent, as we have seen, and only a minority can be 
officers, it makes sense that a fair number will be non-officer representatives of the 
controlling family or group.  Table 10 confirms this.  The board of 67 of the 88 respondents 
(76%) include at least one such person; most firms (66%) have two or more such directors, 
and the mean firm has three such persons on its board.  It is also reasonably common for 
firms to have overlapping boards -- 46 of the 86 respondents on this question (53%) 
indicated that at least one director was also on the board of a related firm. 
Table 10. Non-independent Directors 
Number of non-independent directors who are (i) officers; (ii) representatives of the controlling shareholder 
or group, or (iii) also on the boards of one or more related firms, for 88 Brazilian private firms which 
responded to the 2005 Brazil CG Survey (80 responses for board composition; 86 responses for question 
about related firms).  Percentage is of firms which answered each question. 
No. of 
directors 
All non-
independent 
directors 
% 
Officers 
or former 
officers 
% 
Represents 
controller (but 
not officer) 
% 
On the board 
of related 
firm(s) 
% 
0 0 0% 14 16% 21 24% 59 67% 
1 2 2.5% 35 40% 9 10% 9 10% 
2 4 5% 16 18% 17 19% 4 4.5%
3 25 31% 12 14% 11 13% 0 0% 
4 9 11% 7 8% 7 8% 2 2% 
5 10 12.5% 3 3% 7 8% 3 3% 
6 or more 30 37.5% 1 1% 16 7% 11 12.5%
mean 5.3  1.7  3.1  1.55  
median 4  1  2  1  
D.  Are the CEO and Chairman the Same Person 
A common governance recommendation is that the CEO and Chairman positions 
should be split, to prevent the CEO from having too much power over the firm.  This 
concern is less important when the CEO is a hired manager, facing oversight from a 
controlling family or group.  Separation may also not be important if the CEO is a member 
of the controlling family or group because the controllers, not the board, will decide who 
runs the firm.  Nonetheless, CVM recommends splitting these two roles.19 
Most Brazilian firms have different persons as CEO and Chairman; 62 of the 88 
respondents (71%) separate these two roles.  A separate question is whether some firms 
have a nonexecutive chairman who does not represent the controlling family or group.  This 
pattern is common in the U.K.  We did not ask about this, but the common Brazilian pattern 
is for the chairman to represent the controller. 
E.  Director Characteristics 
There are no legal requirements that directors have particular expertise.  CVM 
recommends that at least two directors should possess "experience in finance and primary 
                                                 
19  CVM Recommendations on Corporate Governance (2002) , § 2.4. 
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focus on accounting practices."  IBGC recommends a diversified board, its list of criteria 
includes "financial knowledge" and "accounting knowledge." IBGC also recommends that 
each firm have an audit committee with at least three members, who should be "familiar 
with basic financial and accounting matters."20  In addition, many cross-listed firms are 
subject to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which applies to all NYSE and NASDAQ-cross-listed 
firms, and contains requirements for audit committees, minimum number of independent 
directors, and other matters. 
Table 11 summarizes which firms have directors with particular characteristics and 
experience.  It is quite common for firms to have a director with financial or accounting 
expertise.  Lawyers are also common board members.  About one-fourth of private firms 
have a politician or former government employee on their boards.  Scholars are apparently 
in less demand; only 8 firms have one on their board. 
Table 11.  Director Expertise and Background 
Characteristics and background of directors of 88 Brazilian private firms which responded to the 2005 Brazil 
CG Survey and provided data on board composition.  Number of responses varied from 85-88.  Percentage is 
of firms which answered each question. 
If yes: One or more directors that are Yes % yes 
Mean Median 
Financial sector specialist 64 74% 3.2 2 
Accounting specialist 50 57% 2.4 1 
Lawyers 46 52% 1.5 1 
Female 29 33% 1.5 1 
Politician or former government employee 26 31% 2.4 2 
Foreign 22 25% 2.6 2 
Employee representative 11 12% 1.2 1 
Scholar 8 10% 1.3 1 
F.  Director Terms in Office 
Table 12 provides information on board terms, and whether they are staggered, with 
a fraction of the board elected each year.  Brazilian law allows directors to serve for terms 
of up to three years, but makes them subject to removal by shareholders at any time.  It is 
silent on whether these terms can be staggered.21  Since most Brazilian firms have a 
controlling shareholder or shareholder group, and in any case shareholders can remove 
directors at any time, a staggered board is not important as a takeover defense.  A staggered 
board can make it more difficult for minority shareholders to elect representatives using 
cumulative voting, but Brazilian law provides other ways for minority shareholders to be 
represented on public company boards.  Thus, in contrast to the United States (Bebchuk, 
Coates, and Subramanian, 2006), a staggered board is likely not an important aspect of 
governance for Brazilian firms.  Only 2 respondents have staggered board terms. 
                                                 
20 CVM Recommendations on Corporate Governance (2002), § 2.1; IBGC Code of Best Practice of Corporate 
Governance (2003), §§ 2.9.2, 2.17. 
21  Law 6404/76, art. 140. 
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Multiyear terms are common:  Almost half (42/88; 48%) use the maximum 3-year 
term permitted by the law; another 15 firms (17%) have two year terms.  CVM and IBGC 
recommend that all board members should serve concurrent one-year terms of office.22  
Bovespa requires directors of companies listed on Level 2 or Novo Mercado to have non-
staggered board terms of either one or two years.23  Bovespa initially required annual terms, 
but changed to instead allow two-year terms -- as we understand, at the request of 
institutional investors who preferred longer terms for their own nominees. 
Table 12. Board Terms; Staggered and Non-Staggered 
Number of years of directors’ terms and whether they are staggered, for 88 Brazilian private firms which 
responded to the 2005 Brazil CG Survey. 
Staggered Non-Staggered total Number of 
years Number of 
firms percent
Number of 
firms percent 
Number of 
firms 
1 -- -- 31 35% 31 
2 0 0 15 17% 15 
3 2 2% 40 46% 42 
total 2 2% 86 98% 88 
VI.  Board and Committee Procedures 
We turn next from the substance of who sits on the board of directors, to the 
procedures the company follows, in holding board and committee meetings. 
A.  Board Meetings and Minutes 
Brazilian law does not require a minimum number of board meetings.  CVM 
recommends that the board should establish a minimum meeting frequency, but contains no 
numerical recommendation; IBGC does not propose a minimum number of meetings, but 
does suggest a maximum of one meeting per month, "to avoid undue interference" in the 
operation of the business.24 
                                                 
22 CVM Recommendations on Corporate Governance (2002), § 2.1; IBGC Code of Best Practice of Corporate 
Governance (2003), § 2.18. 
23 Bovespa Novo Mercado Listing Rules (2006) § 4.4; Bovespa Level 2 Listing Rules (2006) § 5.4 . 
24  CVM Recommendations on Corporate Governance (2002), § 2.2; IBGC Code of Best Practice of 
Corporate Governance (2003), § 2.30. 
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Table 13. Meetings of the Board of Directors 
Number of total, physical, and telephonic board meetings in 2004 for 87 Brazilian private firms which 
responded to the 2005 Brazil CG Survey and provided this information. 
Number of Meetings Total meetings % 
Physical 
meetings % 
telephone 
meetings % 
0 0 0 2 2 75 87 
0 - 3 3 3 5 6 4 5 
4 - 6 24 28 25 29 4 5 
7 - 9 16 18 15 17 1 1 
10 - 12 21 24 18 21 1 1 
13 - 18 8 9 12 14 0 0 
19 or more 15 17 10 12 1 1 
Table 13 provides information on the number and type of board meetings held 
during the previous year (2004).  Most Brazilian firms hold at least 4 meetings per year.  
We asked separately about physical and telephonic meetings, on the grounds that while a 
telephonic meeting can be useful for handling small or emergency items, only a physical 
meeting is likely to generate a real discussion, or useful advice to the company's 
management.  If we treat four physical meetings per year as a minimum for an effective 
board, only seven firms (8%) failed this standard.  However, two firms did not have a 
single physical meeting for the entire year.  One wonders what these firms' directors 
thought their job consisted of. 
Two-thirds of the responding firms (58/87) had between four and 12 meetings per 
year, which is a normal number by international standards.  However, some reported a large 
number of meetings -- indeed ten firms reported 19 or more meetings in the last year.  It is 
possible that these meetings are often short and involve mostly insiders.  This pattern could 
make sense for smaller companies, especially those with no independent directors.  These 
firms might have a weekly or biweekly management meeting, and call it a board meeting.  
Telephone meetings are uncommon.  Only 11 firms (13%) used them at all, although a few 
made frequent use of this meeting procedure. 
A standard corporate governance recommendation is that companies prepare written 
minutes of board meetings, which indicate who attended the meeting, the issues voted on, 
and the voting outcomes.  Brazilian law requires firms to keep minutes of board meetings, 
but does not specify the content of the minutes.25  IBGC recommends that listed companies 
should forward their minutes to CVM or Bovespa, and indicate any dissenting votes.26  A 
fair number of Brazilian firms are lax in this regard.  Five firms (6%) did not keep written 
minutes, despite the legal requirement.  Only about half (41 of 83 respondents on this 
question) recorded directors' votes. 
                                                 
25  Law 6404/76, arts. 100 § VI, 130 § 1. Article 130 states that the minutes "may" include a summary of the 
matters discussed, and any dissents. 
26 IBGC Code of Best Practice of Corporate Governance (2003), § 1.5.4. 
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B. Board Processes 
Table 14 summarizes Brazilian practice for selected board processes.  These 
processes are not required by Brazilian corporate law, but many are recommended by CVM 
and IBGC.  On the whole, Brazilian boards adopt a relatively small number of formal 
processes.  This is consistent with many boards being both small and dominated by the 
controller. 
Both CVM and IBGC recommend that the board of directors annually evaluate the 
CEO's performance.27  Only about a third of responding firms (28/88) do so.  A slightly 
larger number (34/88; 38%) evaluate other officers.  IBGC recommends that the board have 
a succession plan in place for the CEO and all other key persons in the organization.28  
Only 15 firms (21%) have such a plan.  For some firms, however, the controlling family 
may have an informal succession plan within the family -- we did not ask about this. 
Both CVM and IBGC recommend that the board adopt bylaws to regulate its own 
duties and meetings.29   A bit over half of the responding firms (48/88) have done so.  Most 
companies (91%) provide materials to board members in advance of board meetings.30  
However, only a few (7/52; 14%) formally provide for independent directors to retain their 
own advisors, at the company's expense.31 
IBGC recommends that firms should have a code of conduct, approved by the Board 
of Directors, which regulate the relations between the board, shareholders, employees, 
suppliers, and other stakeholders.32  About half of the responding firms have a code of 
conduct; we did not ask about what it covers. 
                                                 
27 CVM Recommendations on Corporate Governance (2002), § 2.1; IBGC Code of Best Practice of Corporate 
Governance (2003), § 2.26. 
28 IBGC Code of Best Practice of Corporate Governance (2003), §2.27. 
29 CVM Recommendations on Corporate Governance (2002) § 2.2; IBGC Code of Best Practice of Corporate 
Governance (2003), § 2.5. 
30  CVM so recommends.  CVM Recommendations on Corporate Governance (2002) § 2.2. 
31  CVM again so recommends.  CVM Recommendations on Corporate Governance (2002) § 2.2. 
32  IBGC Code of Best Practice of Corporate Governance (2003), §3.7. 
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Table 14. Board Processes 
Number of firms which adopted the indicated board processes, for 88 Brazilian private firms which responded 
to the 2005 Brazil CG Survey.  Questions relating to independent directors apply only to 52 firms with one or 
more independent directors.  The survey asked for "yes" answers, but not "no" answers, so we cannot 
distinguish "no" from "missing." 
Process Yes % Yes No/ missing Total 
Affecting all directors     
Regular system for evaluating the CEO's performance 28 32% 60 88 
Succession plan for the CEO 15 21% 73 88 
Regular system for evaluating other officers 34 39% 54 88 
Specific bylaw to govern the activity of the board of directors 48 55% 40 88 
Company code of conduct or ethics 45 51% 43 88 
Board members receive materials in advance of board 
meetings 80 91% 8 88 
Independent directors can obtain outside advice at company's 
expense 7 14% 45 52 
Affecting only independent directors     
Regular system for evaluating independent directors 6 12% 46 52 
Retirement age for independent directors 3 6% 49 52 
Annual meeting exclusively to independent directors 1 2% 51 52 
none of the above 0 88 88 
IBGC recommends that the Chairman should annually review the performance of 
other directors.33  We did not ask about this, but did ask whether the board regularly 
reviews the performance of independent directors.  Only 6 of the 52 firms with one or more 
independent directors did so.  IBGC recommends that firms establish a maximum length of 
service on the board.34  We did not specifically ask about this, but did ask whether firms 
have a retirement age for independent directors; only 3 firms have such a policy.  IBGC 
recommends that independent directors should meet regularly, without officers or other 
directors present, in part so they can assess management's performance.35  Only one 
company has adopted this practice.  To be sure, however, such a practice makes sense only 
if a company has a reasonable number of independent directors, say three or more.  Only 22 
firms have this many independent directors. 
C.  Specific Board Actions 
Brazilian boards are not strong on formal processes, as we have just seen.  But how 
do they behave?  We asked about a number of important board actions within the last five 
years.  At 20 firms (23%), the board had "replaced" the CEO (Portuguese:  substituiu).  
This could include both dismissal for poor performance and normal replacement when the 
                                                 
33  IBGC Code of Best Practice of Corporate Governance (2003), § 2.15. 
34  IBGC Code of Best Practice of Corporate Governance (2003), § 2.19. 
35  IBGC Code of Best Practice of Corporate Governance (2003), § 2.13. 
 21
CEO retires or becomes ill.  Similarly, the board of 25% of the firms had replaced, or asked 
the CEO to replace, one or more officers. 
For firms with independent directors, we asked whether the board had asked an 
independent director to resign, or had not renominated this person, during the last five 
years.  Four firms out of 52 with independent directors (8%) had done so.  None of the 
respondents stated that an independent director had resigned because of a dispute over 
policy during this period. 
Table 15. Actions of the Board 
Number of firms which adopted the indicated board processes, for 88 Brazilian private firms which responded 
to the 2005 Brazil CG Survey.  Questions relating to independent directors apply only to 52 firms with one or 
more independent directors.  The survey does not let us distinguish "no" answers from missing responses. 
Within the last 5 years, has Yes % Yes No or missing Total 
the board replaced the CEO 20 23% 68 88 
the board replaced (or asked the CEO to replace) one or 
more other officers 22 25% 66 88 
the board asked an independent directors to resign, or did not 
propose reelection of an independent director 4 8% 48 52 
an independent director resigned because of a dispute 
over policy 0 0% 52 52 
D.  Board Committees 
Brazilian corporate law is silent on committees of the board of directors, and forbids 
the board from delegating its authority "to another body created by law or [the company's] 
bylaws."36  It is interpreted to permit their creation, but the committee's authority to take 
action remains unclear.  Presumably, a committee can take actions which the board is not 
required to take in the first place, much as management can. 
CVM and IBGC recommend rather vaguely that firms should have "specialized" 
board committees.  They recommend an audit committee, but not other specific 
committees.37  Bovespa has no committee requirements.  Only 25 respondents (28%) have 
standing committees of the board.  Of these firms, 20 (80% of the firms with committees) 
prepare minutes of committee meetings, and of these 20 firms, half (10 firms) record 
directors' votes on agenda items. 
                                                 
36  Law 6404/76, art. 139. 
37  CVM Recommendations on Corporate Governance (2002) §§ 2.2, 4.3; IBGC Code of Best Practice of 
Corporate Governance (2003), §§ 2.8-2.9. 
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Table 16: Board Committees 
Number of firms which adopted the indicated board processes, for 88 Brazilian private firms which responded 
to the 2005 Brazil CG Survey.  Question on existence of committee minutes (content of minutes) apply only 
to 25 firms with one or more standing committees (20 firms which prepare committee minutes). 
 Yes % Yes No Total 
Does the board have standing committees? 25 28% 63 88 
If the board has standing committees, are minutes 
prepared for meetings of the committees? 20 80.0 5 25 
If minutes are prepared for committee meetings, 
are directors' votes recorded in the minutes? 10 50.0 10 20 
VII.  Audit Committee, Fiscal Board, and Independent Auditor 
Brazilian law does not expressly provide for audit committees or other committees 
of the board of directors.  It does provide for a related body, known as a fiscal board, which 
may partly substitute for the audit committee.  We discuss in turn audit committees, fiscal 
boards, and independent auditors, and discuss each in turn. 
A.  Audit Committee 
Audit committees are a familiar part of the overall governance system in many 
countries, but not yet in Brazil.  CVM and IBGC both recommend that firms create an audit 
committee of the board of directors.38  Bovespa does not require an audit committee, for 
any listing level.  Only 15 respondents (17%) of the responding firms have an audit 
committee.  All 15 of these committees include at least one person with accounting 
expertise; at 14 firms the committee meets with the outside auditor at least once per year; 
and 12 firms have  bylaws to govern the committee's operations. 
However, even when an audit committee exists, it is often staffed entirely by inside 
directors.  Only seven of the 15 firms with an audit committee include even a single 
independent director on the committee.  This rather defeats the central value of the 
committee, as used in other countries, which is to provide independent oversight of the 
firm's financial statements and its relations with its outside auditor.  In four of these firms, 
minority shareholders can elect one or more members of the committee.39  But only two 
firms have a committee staffed solely by independent directors.40  Of the five firms with 
both independent and non-independent members of the audit committee, three provide that 
the independent members meet separately with the outside auditors at least once per year. 
                                                 
38  CVM Recommendations on Corporate Governance (2002) § 4.3; IBGC Code of Best Practice of Corporate 
Governance (2003) § 2.9. 
39  CVM recommends that at least one member represent minority shareholders.  CVM Recommendations on 
Corporate Governance (2002) § 4.3. 
40  IBGC, recommends that all members of the audit committee should be independent.  IBGC Code of Best 
Practice of Corporate Governance (2003), § 2.9.1.  CVM recommends that the audit committee should not 
include company officers, but does not recommend that all members be independent.  CVM 
Recommendations on Corporate Governance (2002) § 4.3.  Our survey did not ask whether officers served on 
the audit committee. 
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One customary task for the audit committee is overseeing the company's 
independent auditors.  Under Brazilian law, one board duty is to select and discharge the 
firm's independent auditors.  This duty cannot be delegated.  Thus, while the audit 
committee can recommend hiring or dismissing the auditing firm, doing so requires full 
board action.41 
Table 17.  Audit Committee of the Board of Directors 
Number of firms which have audit committees, and related procedures, for 88 Brazilian private firms which 
responded to the 2005 Brazil CG Survey.  Questions on procedures apply only to 15 firms with an audit 
committee.  Last question applies only to five firms which are known to have both independent and non-
independent members on the audit committee. 
 Yes % Yes No Missing/do not apply Total 
The firm has an audit committee 15 17% 73 0 88 
For firms with an audit committee:      
The committee includes a member with expertise in 
accounting 15 100 0 0 15 
The committee meets with the external auditor at least 
once per year 14 93% 1 0 15 
There is a bylaw to govern the committee 12 80 3 0 15 
Audit committee independence:      
The committee includes at least one independent director 7 47% 6 2 15 
The committee consists solely of independent directors 2 15% 11 2  
Minority shareholders can elect one or more members of 
the committee 4 27% 11 0 15 
If the committee includes both inside and independent 
directors, the independent members meet separately with 
the external auditor at least once per year 
3 60% 2 0 5 
B.  Fiscal Board 
Brazilian corporate law is silent on audit committees, but expressly contemplates 
the creation of a separate body, not part of the board of directors, known as a fiscal board, 
charged with examining the company's financial statements and offering an opinion on 
them.  The fiscal board can engage experts (presumably a second accounting firm), at the 
company's expense.  Each company must provide procedures in its bylaws for the fiscal 
board to operate; the law specifies that it must have between 3 and 5 members.42 
Actual creation of the board is optional -- a company can have a permanent fiscal 
board, or merely provide for the existence from time to time of a temporary board.  A 
temporary fiscal board must be created on demand by minority shareholders representing 
10% of the common shares or 5% of the preferred shares.  The temporary board's authority 
expires at the next annual shareholder meeting; but the shareholder demand for the board 
can be renewed at that meeting.43 
                                                 
41  Law 6404/76, arts. 139 (no board power to delegate power to committees); 142(IX) (board chooses and 
replaces auditors). 
42 Law 6404/76, art. 161 §1. 
43 Law 6404/76, arts. 161, 163. 
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Table 18 describes firms which have a permanent fiscal board.  About 40% of firms 
have such a board (34/88).  If a fiscal board exists, it is required by law to keep minutes; all 
34 firms reported doing so.44  However, only 22 of the firms with permanent fiscal boards 
(65%) record member votes in the minutes.  And 5 of the firms with a permanent fiscal 
board report not having a bylaw to govern the functioning of the fiscal board, even though 
this is required by law.  Only a bit more than half of the firms (18/34:  53%) had fiscal 
boards which includes a member with accounting expertise. 
Table 18. Fiscal Board 
Number of firms which have a permanent fiscal board, and related procedures, for 88 Brazilian private firms 
which responded to the 2005 Brazil CG Survey.  Questions on procedures apply only to 34 firms with a 
permanent fiscal board. 
 Yes % Yes No  Total 
Does the company have a permanent fiscal board? 34 39% 54 88 
For firms with a permanent fiscal board     
minutes are prepared for meetings of the board 34 100% 0 34 
there a bylaw to govern the fiscal board? 29 85% 5 34 
when minutes  are  prepared, directors' votes are recorded in the 
minutes? 22 65% 12 34 
the board includes a member with expertise in accounting 18 53% 16 34 
Table 19 provides details on the size of the permanent fiscal board, and how often it 
meets with the external auditor.  Three firms have a board of at least six members, despite 
the statutory requirement of a 3-5 member board.  To be sure, the policy reasons for 
capping fiscal board size at five members are not apparent.  Most board meet with the 
external auditor either quarterly (16 firms) or annually (11 firms); but at three firms the 
fiscal board does not meet with the external auditor at all. 
Table 19.  Permanent Fiscal Board:  Size and Meetings with Auditors 
Size of fiscal board and number of meetings with external auditor, for 34 Brazilian private firms which have a 
permanent fiscal board and responded to the 2005 Brazil CG Survey. 
Number of 
members No of firms  
No. of meetings (per 
year) 
Number of meetings between fiscal board 
and external auditor 
3 17  (50%) 0 3  (9%) 
4 4  (12%) 1 11  (32%) 
5 10  (29%) 2 or 3 3  (9%) 
6 or more 3  (9%) 4 16  (47%) 
  5 1  (3%) 
We turn next to minority shareholder representation on the fiscal board.  One might 
think that the fiscal board, much like the audit committee, should be a watchdog on behalf 
of noncontrolling shareholders.  If so, including representatives of controlling shareholders 
on the board makes little sense.  This is not, however, how Brazilian corporate law 
                                                 
44  Law 6404/76, art. 100(VI). 
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operates.  The law instead gives the holders of preferred shares the right to elect one 
member of the fiscal board, and gives minority common shareholders holding at least 10% 
of the common shares a similar right.  Other common shareholders can then elect the 
remaining members, in a number equal to those elected by preferred shareholders and 
minority common shareholders plus one.45 This ensures that the controlling shareholders 
can control the fiscal board. 
CVM has a complex recommendation on the composition of the fiscal board -- it 
recommends that minority shareholders should have the right to elect one (two) member(s) 
out of a three or five member board if the control group elects one (two) members.  The 
controlling group should then cede its rights to elect the last member, who should instead 
be elected by a shareholder vote, with common and preferred shares each carrying one vote.  
IBGC has a similar recommendation.46  We did not ask whether any firms adopt this 
complex structure, but two firms reported having three representatives of minority 
shareholders, perhaps because they followed this approach. 
Table 20 provides information on the minority shareholder representatives on 
permanent fiscal board.  Only 3 firms (9%) have no minority representatives.  But another 
19 firms (56%) have only one minority shareholder representative on the fiscal board, and 
only three firms have three or more minority representatives (who therefore comprise a 
majority of the board). 
Table 20.  Minority Representation on Permanent Fiscal Board 
Minority shareholder representatives on fiscal board for 34 Brazilian private firms which have a permanent 
fiscal board and responded to the 2005 Brazil CG Survey. 
represent minority common shares  
0 1 2 total 
0 3 2 0 5 
1 17 7 1 25 
2 2 1 0 3 
6 1 0 0 1 re
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total 23 10 1 34 
One might think that the audit committee and the fiscal board are likely to be 
substitutes, so that even firms which had one or the other might not have both.  As Table 21 
shows, this was partly true, but only partly.  Of the 15 firms with audit committees, 7 had a 
permanent fiscal board as well; 8 did not.  Of the 73 firms without an audit committee, 27 
(31%) had a permanent fiscal board, but 46 firms (52%) had neither. 
                                                 
45 Law 6404/76 Art. 161, § 4 b. 
46  CVM Recommendations on Corporate Governance (2002) § 4.2; IBGC Code of Best Practice of Corporate 
Governance (2003) § 5.2. 
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Table 21. Crosstabulation:  Audit Committee and Permanent Fiscal Board 
Crosstabulation for firms with audit committee, permanent fiscal board, both, or neither, for 88 Brazilian 
private firms which responded to the 2005 Brazil CG Survey. 
 Permanent fiscal board No permanent fiscal board 
No. of firms Percent No. of firms Percent 
Total 
Audit 
committee 
7 8%  8 9%  15 
No audit 
committee 27 31% 46 52% 73 
total 34 39% 54 61% 88 
Next, what about the firms without a permanent fiscal board?  How often did 
shareholders demand that the firm create a non-permanent board?  Table 22 provides this 
information.  At 24 of the 52 firms which responded to this question, the nominally non-
permanent board was, in practice, permanent or nearly so, having been convened in four or 
five of the last five years.47  If we treat these firms as having a permanent or near-
permanent fiscal board, two thirds of the responding firms (58/88) have such a fiscal board.  
Of the remaining 30 firms, two have an audit committee, leaving 28 firms (32%) with 
neither an audit committee nor a permanent or near permanent fiscal board.  At all but 12 
firms, a fiscal board has been convened at least once during the last five years (3 of these 
12 firms have audit committees).  Thus, the fiscal board is an important institution in 
Brazil.  Further research is needed to understand its strengths and weaknesses, compared to 
an audit committee, and whether it makes sense for a firm to have both a fiscal board and 
an audit committee. 
Table 22.  Non-Permanent Fiscal Board:  How Often Used  
Number of times non-permanent fiscal board was convened during last five years, for 52 Brazilian private 
firms which do not have a permanent fiscal board and responded to this question on the 2005 Brazil CG 
Survey. 
Number of times convened number of firms percentage 
0 12 23% 
1 7 14% 
2 4 8% 
3 5 10% 
4 10 19% 
5 14 27% 
C.  External Auditor 
Brazilian law requires public Brazilian firms to have their financial statements 
audited by an independent auditor.48  CVM rules require public companies to rotate their 
                                                 
47  One firm indicated that the non-permanent board had been convened 20 times -- we interpreted this to 
mean quarterly meetings each year in each of the last five years. 
48  Law 6404/76 Art. 177, § 3. 
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external auditor every five years.   Once an auditor has been rotated away from a particular 
company, the company cannot rehire this auditor for at least three years.49  Only two firms 
reported having the same auditor for more than five years. 
We asked firms whether they had replaced their external auditor within the last five 
years.  In theory, all firms should have done so, but in practice, only 49 firms answered yes.  
Of these, 31 cited "legal reasons" (presumably the rotation requirement).  Of the others, six 
responded that their auditor had gone out of business, six were unhappy with the auditor's 
fees, and six cited "other reasons."  Four firms indicated their reasons -- two wanted to use 
the same auditor as the controlling firm (2 firms), one moved to an internationally known 
auditor (1 firm), and one cited "unspecified problems."  No firm reported changing auditors 
after a dispute over accounting policy.  However, such a dispute could still have been part 
or most of the reason for replacement in some cases. 
We asked whether the auditor also performs non-audit services.  Providing these 
services could create a conflict of interest for the auditor, since if it loses the firm as an 
audit client, it will likely lose non-audit contracts as well.  CVM recommends that public 
companies should not hire their auditors for other services that may raise conflicts of 
interests, and should limit non-audit fees as a percentage of total fees paid to the auditor.  
IBGC recommends more mildly that the audit committee (or the board for firms without an 
audit committee) "should be aware of" all services provided by the external auditor, should 
disclose to shareholders the auditing and other fees paid to the external auditor, and should 
be sensitive to the potential for conflicts.50  Only 16 firms (18%) obtain non-audit services 
from their auditor.  In part, this may be because mandatory rotation prevents the long-term 
relationships which are likely to lead to firms using their auditor for non-audit services.  Of 
these firms, only five reported that non-audit fees represented 10% or more of the auditor's 
total fees. 
Table 23.  Relation with External Auditor 
Information about external auditor for 88 Brazilian private firms which responded to the 2005 Brazil CG 
Survey.  Responses on replacement of auditor exclude replacement for legal reasons. 
Within the last 5 years... Yes Yes % 
Company employs external auditor for non-audit services 16 18% 
Company replaced the external auditor 18 20% 
Reason for replacing auditor:   
Auditor went out of business 6 7% 
Fees charged 6 7% 
Disagreement over accounting policy 0 0 
Other reasons 6 7% 
                                                 
49  Instruction CVM No. 308 (1999), art. 31. 
50 CVM Recommendations on Corporate Governance (2002) § 4.4; IBGC Code of Best Practice of Corporate 
Governance (2003) § 4.6. 
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VIII.  Shareholder Meetings and Shareholder Rights 
We discuss in Part V above the rights of minority shareholders to elect 
representatives to the board of directors.  We discuss in this part the rights of minority 
shareholders in connection with shareholder meetings, sales of control, share offerings, and 
other matters. 
A.  Shareholder Meetings 
Table 24 reports responses to several questions related to the holding of shareholder 
meetings.  Brazilian law requires public companies to provide at least 15 days notice of a 
shareholder meeting, including the agenda for the meeting.  However, both CVM and 
IBGC recommend 30 days notice, and CVM recommends 40 days for firms whose shares 
are cross-listed in other markets.51  Only seven firms (8%) reported that they provide at 
least 30 days notice of shareholder meetings (2 of these are cross-listed on a foreign 
exchange). 
Brazilian law requires the notice of a shareholder meeting to include the agenda for 
the meeting.  IBGC recommends that the agenda and accompanying documentation "should 
be as detailed as possible." CVM recommends that the notice should contain a "precise 
description" of the agenda items. 52  We asked firms whether the names of director 
candidates are included in the notice of a shareholder meeting.  Only 12 firms (14%) 
answered that they do so. 
Table 24.  Shareholder Meetings 
Sample is 86 Brazilian private firms which responded to the 2005 Brazil CG Survey and provided information 
on shareholder meetings.  Number of responses varies from 84 to 86. 
Provision Yes % yes 
Company provides at least 30 days notice of annual meeting 7 8% 
Company discloses director candidate names in advance of annual meeting 12 14% 
Company considers conflicts with annual meetings of others companies in the same 
industry when it schedules its annual meeting 18 21% 
Company discloses an annual agenda of corporate events 35 41% 
CVM recommends that meetings should be held at dates and times that "do not 
impair shareholder attendance"; IBGC recommends affirmatively choosing the venue, date 
and time to encourage attendance.53  We asked whether, in scheduling annual meetings, 
companies consider possible conflicts with the annual meetings of other companies in the 
same industry.  Only eighteen firms (21%) reported doing so. 
                                                 
51  Law 6404/76, art. 124, § 1, item II; CVM Recommendations on Corporate Governance (2002) § 1.2; IBGC 
Code of Best Practice of Corporate Governance (2003) § 1.5.2. 
52  Law 6404/76, art. 124; CVM Recommendations on Corporate Governance (2002) § 1.1; IBGC Code of 
Best Practice of Corporate Governance (2003) § 1.5.4. 
53  CVM Recommendations on Corporate Governance (2002) § 1.1; IBGC Code of Best Practice of Corporate 
Governance (2003) § 1.5.3. 
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Firms listed on Bovespa Level 1 and higher must provide investors, by the end of 
January of each year, with an agenda of important corporate events for the year, including 
the date of the annual shareholder meeting.54  A fair number of firms (35 firms; 41%) do 
this. 
B.  Rights of Preferred Shareholders 
Table 25 reports survey results for questions relating to the rights of preferred 
shareholders.  Most Brazilian companies issue preferred (non-voting) shares -- 74 of the 86 
firms which responded to the questions on shareholder rights have issued preferred shares.   
Brazilian law requires that public companies which issue preferred shares give these shares 
one of three types of advantages, relative to common shares.  These advantages, and the 
number of firms which provide them, are:55 
• dividends 10% higher than the dividends on common shares (39 firms, or 53%); 
• dividends of at least 25% of net income (25 firms, or 34%); 
• takeout rights on a sale of control, which provide at least 80% of the per-share price 
paid for the control block (17 firms, or 23%). 
IBGC recommends that firms provide takeout rights for both preferred shares and minority 
common shares at 100% of the per share price paid for control.56  Bovespa requires takeout 
rights for preferred shares for Level 2 firms, at at least 80% of the per share price paid for 
control.57  Of the 17 firms which provide takeout rights to preferred shareholders, 12 do so 
at 80% of the per-share price paid for control; the other 5 firms do so at 100% of this price.   
                                                 
54  Bovespa Level 1 Listing Rules (2006), § 4.5. 
55  Law 6404/76, art. 17.  Under Law 6404/76, art. 111, preferred shares acquire voting rights if no dividends 
are paid for a period specified in the bylaws, which cannot exceed 3 years. 
56  IBGC Code of Best Practice of Corporate Governance (2003) § 1.6. 
57  Bovespa Level 2 Listing Rules (2006), § 8.13.  Three of the 17 firms which provide takeout rights to 
preferred shareholders are listed on Bovespa Level 2. 
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Table 25.  Selected Rights of Preferred Shareholders 
Sample is 74 Brazilian private firms which responded to the 2005 Brazil CG Survey and have preferred 
shares. 
 Yes % yes 
Special rights (one of these is required by law)   
10% higher dividends than on common shares 39 53% 
Dividends of at least 25% of net income 25 34% 
Takeout rights, at price of at least 80% of the price paid for the 
control block 17 23% 
Voting rights   
Mergers, transformations and similar transactions 9 12% 
Transactions with controlling shareholder involving conflict of 
interest, which require shareholder approval 6 8% 
Evaluation of non-monetary assets given in exchange for stocks 2 3% 
Approving the external company which determines economic value 
during a freezeout 3 4% 
Freezeout must be at price based on economic value of the company 8 11% 
Company has a class of preferred shares that gives special voting rights to its 
holders when compared to other preferred shares  3 4% 
We also asked whether the company provides voting rights to preferred 
shareholders on particular matters.  Bovespa's Level 2 rules require preferred shareholders 
to have voting rights, together with the common shareholders, for:58 
(a) transformation, merger, consolidation or spin-off of the company; 
(b) approval of conflict-of-interest transactions with a controlling shareholder 
(assuming that the transaction is one which requires shareholder approval under law 
or the company’s bylaws); 
(c) valuation of non-monetary assets contributed in exchange for shares; and 
(d) changes to the bylaws which affect the rights of preferred shareholders. 
CVM recommends that preferred shareholders have voting rights in the first three 
instances.59   
Our sample includes 3 firms listed on Level 2, so the minimum number of yes 
responses for each of these rights should be 3.  However, some respondents may not have 
been fully familiar with Bovespa's rules.  A few firms provide the first two rights, even 
though they are not listed on Level 2.  Nine firms give preferred shareholders voting rights 
on mergers; six do so for conflict-of-interest transactions with the controlling shareholder. 
                                                 
58  Bovespa Level 2 Listing Rules (2006), §§ 4.1(V), 10.1.1. 
59 CVM Recommendations on Corporate Governance (2002) § 3.1.  CVM also recommends that preferred 
shareholders have voting rights for major changes in the company's activity and reduction of mandatory 
dividends.  We did not ask about this. 
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We also asked whether firms provide in their bylaws that during a freezeout, the 
price paid for preferred shares will be based on the economic value of the company.  Eight 
firms provide this right (11%).  This compares with 18 firms (21%) which provide this 
right to minority common shareholders. 
We also asked whether any companies had issued a special class of preferred shares 
which conveys greater voting rights to its holders than other classes of preferred shares.  
Three companies provide these rights; for one of these, the shares are special "golden 
shares" retained by the government during privatization. 
C.  Minority Common Shareholders:  Freezeout and Takeout Rights 
Table 26 summarizes the rights of minority shareholders in freezeouts and sales of 
control.  We asked whether companies provide in their bylaws for freezeouts to take place 
at a price based on the economic value of the company and, if so, whether minority 
shareholders (minority common shareholders together with preferred shareholders, if any) 
can vote to approve the external company which provides the valuation.  Bovespa Level 2 
and Novo Mercado rules require both of these rights.60  For Level 2 firms, preferred 
shareholders have similar rights, as discussed in the previous subsection. 
Ten companies provide for a freezeout offer to minority common shareholders 
based on economic value.  Five of these firms are listed on Level 2 or Novo Mercado.  
However, only four firms give voting rights to minority shareholders to approve the 
external company.  Two of these firms are listed on Level 2 or Novo Mercado. 
Table 26.  Minority Common Shareholders:  Freezeout and Takeout Rights 
Sample is 86 Brazilian private firms which responded to the 2005 Brazil CG Survey. 
Question Yes % yes 
If company goes private, it will make a tender offer for minority common shares, 
at a price based on the shares' economic value  10 12% 
If yes, the external company which determines economic value  must be approved 
by minority shareholders: 4 40% 
Bylaws give takeout rights to common shareholders at 100% of per-share 
price paid for control 12 14% 
Brazilian law requires that, in a sale of control, the acquirer must make a takeout 
offer to minority common shareholders, and offer at least 80% of the per-share price paid 
for the controlling shares.61  IBGC recommends that this offer be at 100% of the price paid 
for the controlling shares; Bovespa requires this for Level 2 and Novo Mercado firms.62  
We asked whether companies go beyond the 80% legal floor.  Twelve companies do so, 
                                                 
60  Bovespa Level 2 Listing Rules (2006), § 4.1. 
61  Law 6040/76, Art 254-A. 
62  IBGC Code of Best Practice of Corporate Governance (2003) § 1.6; Bovespa Level 2 Listing Rules 2006), 
§ 10.2. 
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including the 5 Level 2 and Novo Mercado firms; all of these companies provide takeout 
rights at 100% of the per-share price paid for control. 
D.  Preemptive Rights 
Table 27 reports Brazilian practice related to another important protection for 
minority shareholders -- preemptive rights.  An initial question is whether the company's 
charter provides for "authorized capital" (similar to authorized but unissued shares for a 
U.S. firm)  If not, then issuance of shares requires a charter amendment, and minority 
shareholders will have preemptive rights.63  Sixty-one of the responding firms (71%) have 
authorized capital.  Of these, 45 provide preemptive rights to shareholders in all cases; 
another 8 firms do so some of the time.  If we combine firms which have no authorized 
capital and firms which have preemptive rights, preemptive rights are the norm, provided 
by 70 firms (81%) in all cases, and another 8 firms (9%) in some cases. 
E.  Arbitration and Lawsuits 
Until recently, Brazil did not have specialized business courts.  Rio and Sao Paulo 
have recently created these courts, but the Sao Paulo court hears only bankruptcy and 
financial restructuring cases.  How effective these courts will be remains uncertain.  In most 
instances, the judicial process moves slowly, and judges often have little experience in 
corporate issues.  As a way around these problems with the court system, CVM and IBGC 
recommend that companies provide in their bylaws that disputes between shareholders and 
the company or between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders will be 
resolved through arbitration.64  Bovespa requires that Level 2 and Novo Mercado 
companies provide for arbitration of disputes with shareholders, using a Bovespa-sponsored 
Market Arbitration Panel.65 
In practice, arbitration is not popular, except as part of a Level 2 or Novo Mercado 
listing.  The 5 Level 2 or Novo Mercado companies in our sample provide for arbitration, 
but only one other firm does so.  To date, the arbitration mechanism has not been used. 
We also asked companies about the number of lawsuits (or arbitration complaints) 
filled by minority shareholders in the last two years.  Most firms (74 firms; 89%) reports no 
lawsuits; 5 firms (6%) report one lawsuits, and 4 firms (5%) report two or more. 
F.  Free Float 
Bovespa requires firms listed on Level 1 and higher to maintain free float (shares 
held by minority shareholders/total issue common and preferred shares) of at least 25%.66  
                                                 
63  Law 6040/76, arts. 171-172. 
64 CVM Recommendations on Corporate Governance (2002) § 3.6; IBGC Code of Best Practice of Corporate 
Governance (2003), §1.9.  Brazilian Arbitration Law 9307/96 requires that the arbitration panel reach a 
decision within 180 days after hearing a case. 
65 Bovespa Level 2 Listing Rules (2006), § 3.1(iv); . 
66  Bovespa Level 1 Listing Rules (2006), § 3.1 (ii). 
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This rule is meant to ensure a reasonable level of liquidity for minority shares; it prevents a 
"creeping freezeout," in which controllers gradually buy minority shares, which reduces 
liquidity and hence price for the remaining shares.  We asked how many firms had free 
float of this level or higher; 51 firms (59%) have this level of minority ownership.  We also 
asked whether firms disclose their free float percentage to shareholders; 53 firms (62%) 
report doing so. 
IX.  Related Party Transactions 
An important aspect of corporate governance for many Brazilian firms is the extent 
to which they engage in related party transactions of various sort.  Table 27 reports 
responses to a variety of questions about whether these transactions exist, whether they are 
disclosed, and how they are approved. 
CVM and IBGC recommend that related party transactions be disclosed, that they 
be on market terms, and that companies not make loans to related parties.  IBGC 
recommends that the fairness of a related party transaction should be based on an 
independent assessment; CVM also recommends that minority shareholders be given the 
opportunity to request that an independent entity assess the fairness of a related party 
transaction.67  Bovespa's rules for Level 1, Level 2 and Novo Mercado require disclosure of 
related party transactions involving the greater of R$ 200.000 (a bit over US$100,000) or 
1% of the company’s net worth.68 
In practice, only a small number of respondents reported having loans outstanding 
to related parties (4 firms, 5%), renting property from a related party (3 firms, 4%), or 
buying or selling significant amounts from or to a related party (7 firms, 8%).  So far, so 
good, although one might suspect some underreporting of related party transactions. 
A substantial majority reported that significant related party transactions are 
disclosed to shareholders (59 firms; 69%).  It is unclear how to interpret the remaining 
responses -- some firms could have answered no because they have no related party 
transactions to disclosure, rather than because they do not or would not disclose such a 
transaction. 
                                                 
67  CVM Recommendations on Corporate Governance (2002) § 3.4; IBGC Code of Best Practice of Corporate 
Governance (2003) § 6.2.1. 
68  Bovespa Level 1 Listing Rules (2006), § 6.8. 
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Table 27. Related Party Transactions 
Sample is 86 Brazilian private firms which responded to the 2005 Brazil CG Survey. 
   Yes % Yes 
Existence and Disclosure     
Has the company lent money to related parties   4 5% 
Does the company rent property from a related party   3 4% 
Does the company buy or sell a significant amount of 
goods or services to or from a related party 
  7 8% 
Are the details of significant related party transactions disclosed to 
shareholders 
  59 69% 
Approval of Related Party Transactions with director or officer controller 
 Yes % Yes Yes % Yes 
No special approval 17 20% 15 17% 
Approval by the board of directors 58 67% 56 65% 
Approval by nonconflicted directors  12 14% 10 12% 
Approval by shareholders 8 9% 11 13% 
Approval by nonconflicted shareholders 4 5% 8 9% 
Matters are less satisfactory with regard to approval of related party transactions.  
Brazilian law, in theory, bars shareholders from voting if their interests conflict with the 
company's interests.69  However, in practice, controlling shareholders often vote.  Some 
cases have held that if a conflicted person votes, the vote should not be counted.  Other 
cases suggest that the vote will stand unless the minority shareholders prove that the 
transaction caused material damage to the company, a standard which is very hard to meet.  
We asked separately about transactions with a director or officer, and transactions with a 
controlling shareholder.  Table 28 reports the responses -- the approval procedures were 
similar for both groups.  About two-thirds of the responding firms report that they require 
board approval.  Of the firms which did not require board approval, about half expressly 
answered that they had no special procedures for approval of related party transactions.  As 
we saw in Part V, many Brazilian boards have few or no independent directors.  Only 12 
firms (14%) report that nonconflicted directors must approve significant related party 
transactions. 
Only a small number of firms indicated that approval by nonconflicted shareholders 
is required.  For transactions with directors or officers, only 8 firms require shareholder 
approval and of these, only four firms require approval by nonconflicted shareholders.  For 
transactions with a controlling shareholder, the numbers are only slightly higher, despite the 
nominal requirement in Brazilian law for approval by nonconflicted shareholders. 
                                                 
69  Law 6404/76, art. 115(1). 
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X.  Disclosure 
A.  Financial Statements 
We asked firms about a variety of disclosures of financial information which go 
beyond those required by Brazilian law.  For example, Brazilian law contains detailed 
requirements for financial statements, but does not require either a statement of cash flows 
or quarterly consolidated financial statements (it does require annual consolidated 
statements).70  Bovespa requires additional financial disclosure for firms on its higher 
listing levels, including: 
• a statement of cash flows (Level 1 and higher); 
• International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) or U.S. GAAP financials, with a 
note reconciling these statements to Brazilian financial statements (Level 2 and 
Novo Mercado); 
• English language financial statements (Level 2 and Novo Mercado); and 
• consolidated quarterly financial statements (Level 2 and Novo Mercado).71 
We asked firms about each of these, and also about whether they provide textual discussion 
of financial results, similar to the "management's discussion and analysis" required by U.S. 
securities rules for U.S. companies.  Table 28 indicates how many firms provide each 
disclosure.  Some firms do so as part of overall compliance with a set of Bovespa listing 
level rules, but some do so separate from any Bovespa standards.  The table indicates the 
total number of firms which provide particular disclosures, and also the number which do 
so separate from compliance with Bovespa listing level rules. 
Almost half (47%) provide English language financial statements.  In addition, 37 
companies (43%) include a statement of cash flows in their financial statements, and 26 
firms (30%) provide IFRS or U.S. GAAP financials.  In addition, a large majority of 
companies (83%) provide textual, "MD&A" discussion of their financial results.  In many 
cases, firms provide disclosures even though the firm does not need to do so as part of a 
package of Bovespa listing level requirements.  Some of these firms cross-listed, and are 
complying with cross-listing requirements. 
At the same time, some firms are choosing which additional disclosures to provide.  
For example, of the 26 firms which provide IFRS or U.S. GAAP financial statements, 5 do 
so to comply with Bovespa listing level requirements, 16 do so to comply with cross-listing 
requirements, and the remaining 5 do so other than in connection with Bovespa listing or 
cross-listing requirements.  At the same time, only 11 firms reconcile their IFRS or U.S. 
GAAP financial statements to their Brazilian financial statements.  Perhaps these firms 
judge that investors can do this for themselves.  Consolidated financial statements are also 
not popular.  Only 17 firms (20%) provide consolidated quarterly financial statements. 
                                                 
70 Law 6404/76, arts. 176-188 contains requirements for financial statements. 
71  Bovespa Level 1 Listing Rules (2006), § 4.2; Level 2 Listing Rules (2006), § 6.1-6.2. 
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Table 28.  Financial Statements 
Sample is 86 Brazilian private firms which responded to the 2005 Brazil CG Survey. 
Area Bovespa rule Yes % yes 
Yes (not related 
to Bovespa 
listing level) 
Company provides financial statements in English Level 2 41 47% 35 
Financial statements include a statement of cash 
flows Level 1 37 43% 14 
Company provides financial statements which 
comply with IFRS or U.S. GAAP Level 2 26 30% 20 
IFRS or U.S. GAAP financial statements are 
reconciled to Brazilian financial statements Level 2 11 42% 5 
Company's publishes consolidated quarterly 
financial statements 
Level 2 (if has 
consolidated annual 
statements) 
17 20% 11 
Financial reports include discussion and analysis of 
factors that most influenced results and company's 
main risk factors (similar to U.S. MD&A disclosure)
 71 83%  
Company officers hold regular meetings with 
analysts 
Level 1 (annual 
meetings) 53 62%  
A majority of firms (53 firms, 62%) report that company officers meet regularly 
with analysts.  Bovespa requires firms on Level 1 or higher to hold at least an annual 
meeting with analysts.72  Of the firms which do not meet regularly with analysts, some may 
be small enough so that they have little no analyst coverage. 
B.  Website Disclosure 
One important means of disclosure is through company websites.  We asked 
whether companies provide different types of information on their websites.  Table 29 
summarizes the responses, and also whether similar information is available from the CVM 
website.  About half of the firms (40 firms; 47%) have English language disclosure on their 
websites.  Of these, 32 also provide English language financial statements. 
Consider financial disclosure first.  Two-thirds of the firms (58 firms) provide 
annual financial statements on their website; most of these (51 firms) also provide quarterly 
financial statements.  This information is also available from the CVM website, but in a 
different, CVM-specified format.  A similar number of firms provide a written annual 
report to shareholders.  Almost 50% provide press releases. 
                                                 
72 Bovespa Level 1 Listing Rules (2006), § 4.4, Bovespa Level 2 Listing Rules (2006), § 6.6. 
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Table 29. Information on Company Website 
Sample is 86 Brazilian private firms which responded to the 2005 Brazil CG Survey. 
Process Yes % Yes On CVM website
English language disclosure 40 47%  
Financial and related information    
annual financial statements 58 67% yes 
quarterly financial statements 51 59% yes 
annual report to shareholders 53 62%  
press releases 42 49% yes 
stock prices (or link to site with this information) 35 41%  
Shareholder meetings and related information    
notice of upcoming shareholder meetings 36 42%  
discussion of the results of shareholder meetings 20 23%  
background information about board members 27 31% yes 
Bylaws and minutes    
bylaws 37 43% yes 
minutes of meetings of the board of directors 26 30%  
minutes of meetings of the fiscal board* 6 19%  
Other information    
material changes in facts relevant to share price 51 59% yes 
other information material to shareholders 48 56% yes 
None of the above 15 18%  
*There are 32 firms with a permanent fiscal board.  See Part VII.B. 
For shareholder meetings, 36 firms (42%) provide notice of the meeting on the 
company website; a smaller number (20 firms; 23%) post the voting results after the 
meeting.  A fair number of firms post their bylaws (37 firms; 43%).  Fewer firms post 
minutes of board meetings.  However, it is not clear that posting minutes of board meetings 
should be seen as part of good governance.  One concern is that if firms know they will 
need to post the minutes, they will ensure that the minutes are bland -- and hence of limited 
value to shareholders.  Moreover, knowledge that the minutes will be posted might chill 
boardroom discussion.  A similar analysis applies to minutes of fiscal board meetings, 
which are provided by 6 firms.  Finally, 15 firms (18%) have quite uninformative websites, 
which contain none of the information we asked about. 
XI.  Control and Shareholder Agreements 
A.  Control 
Almost all Brazilian firms have a controlling shareholder or group.  The type of 
control varies.  Twenty firms (24%) are directly controlled by a single shareholder.  
Another 16 are controlled by a non-public company and 5 by another public company, 
which itself likely has a controlling shareholder or group.  Another 10 firms are controlled 
by a family, and 30 by another group of shareholders.  Three firms indicated "other" as the 
form of control, and only one firm indicated that it had no controlling shareholder or group.  
Table 30 summarizes the nature of control of the firms in our sample.  
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Table 30. Controlled Firms 
Type of control, for 85 Brazilian private firms which responded to the questions on type of control in the 2005 
Brazil CG Survey. 
 Private Firms 
Type of control No. of firms % of firms 
single shareholder 20 24% 
another non-public company 16 19% 
another public company 5 6% 
family 10 12% 
group of shareholders 30 35% 
other 3 4% 
no controlling shareholder or group 1 1% 
B.  Shareholder Agreements 
In many firms with a controlling shareholder or group, a single person has effective 
control.  But in some firms, the control group is diffuse enough so that its members find it 
useful to enter into a shareholder agreement to ensure cohesive voting for directors, and 
perhaps on other issues.  Brazilian law facilitates enforcement of these agreements.  Under 
2001 amendments to Brazilian corporate law, a shareholder agreement, if filed with the 
company and made publicly available, is binding on the company.  Votes at a shareholder 
meeting by members of the control group, which violate the agreement, will not be 
counted.  Agreements which are not registered with the company are treated as private 
agreements, enforceable between the parties to the agreement, but not against the 
corporation or its directors. 
In addition, directors who are elected under a filed agreement are required to vote in 
accordance with the terms of the agreement.  There is no explicit exception for cases where 
doing so would conflict with their judgment on what is best for the firm or best for non-
controlling shareholders.73  Yet a separate, older provision of Brazilian law requires a 
director to support the company's best interests, "even at the expense of those who elected 
him."74  The tension between these provisions has not yet been addressed by the Brazilian 
courts.  Because the rule on enforcement of shareholder agreements is fairly recent, the 
number of companies at which shareholder agreements are used, and the scope of these 
agreements, is likely still in flux.  Gorga (2007) studies the specific provisions of Brazilian 
shareholder agreements. 
IBGC and CVM both recommend that shareholder agreements should be available 
to all shareholders.  IBGC also recommends that the agreement should not limit the voting 
powers of directors or include provisions on selection of officers (thus leaving this to the 
board).75  
                                                 
73  Law 6404/76, art. 118. 
74  Law 6406/76, art. 154 § 1. 
75 IBGC Code of Best Practice of Corporate Governance (2003) § 1.3; CVM Recommendations on Corporate 
Governance (2002) § 1.3. 
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Table 31 summarizes the responses relating to shareholder agreements.  A 
substantial minority of firms (36 firms; 42%) have a shareholder agreement among the 
members of the controlling family or group.  Of these firms, two-thirds (24 firms) indicated 
that the shareholder agreement was used to ensure control. Election of directors is a 
common subject of such an agreement -- 22 firms indicated that one or more directors were 
elected in accordance with the agreement.  Of these firms, roughly half (12 firms) rely on 
the shareholder agreement to elect four or more directors; in each case these directors are a 
majority of the board. 
Table 31. Shareholder Agreements 
Sample is 86 Brazilian private firms which responded to the 2005 Brazil CG Survey. 
 Yes % Yes 
There are one or more shareholder agreement(s) among a family 
or other shareholder group 36 42% 
For firms with a shareholder agreement:   
Control is ensured through the agreement(s) 24 67% 
The agreement governs the election of one or more directors 22 61% 
The shareholder agreement(s) are registered with the company 33 92% 
Shareholder agreements are not registered with the company, 
but are disclosed to minority shareholders 1 33% 
Of the 36 firms with agreements, 33 (92%) have filed them with the company, thus 
taking advantage of the power to enforce the agreement against the company and its 
directors.  For the remaining 3 firms, the contents of the agreement are disclosed at one 
firm.  At the remaining two firms, the terms of the agreement are not publicly known. 
XII.  Director and Executive Compensation 
Our survey provides us with only limited information on compensation of directors 
and executives.  We asked questions about specific levels of compensation, but in contrast 
to the remainder of the questionnaire, there was substantial reluctance to respond. 
We did obtain reasonably complete responses to more general questions.  These are 
summarized in Table 32.  Firms rarely use stock options.  Only 12 firms (14%) provide 
them to officers; only two firms provide them to non-executive directors.  No firms pay 
their non-executive directors partly on shares.  Four firms provide retirement benefits to 
non-executive directors. 
IBGC recommends that directors should receive incentives to align their interests 
with those of shareholders.  However, IBGC does not detail how this could be done, other 
than a peculiar recommendation that directors be paid "on the same hourly basis used for 
the CEO, including bonuses and benefit commensurate with the time effectively dedicated 
to her function." .  IBGC similarly recommends that executive compensation should be 
linked to results, though again without specifying how.  Finally, IBGC recommends that 
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the company disclose the compensation of directors and officers "on an individual or 
aggregate basis." 76 
Table 32. Director and Officer Compensation 
Sample is 84 Brazilian private firms which responded to the 2005 Brazil CG Survey and answered the general 
questions on compensation. 
Question Yes % Yes 
officers receive stock options 12 14% 
non-executive directors receive stock options 2 2% 
non-executive directors are paid partly with shares 0 0 
non-executive directors receive retirement benefits 4 5% 
XIII.  Conclusion 
In this paper we provide a detailed overview of the corporate governance practices 
of Brazilian private firms (firms without majority ownership by the government or by a 
foreign company).  The overview is based primarily on an extensive 2005 survey of 
governance at 116 Brazilian public firms, including 88 Brazilian private firms.  We identify 
areas where Brazilian corporate governance is relatively strong and weak, and areas where 
regulation might usefully be relaxed or strengthened. 
Board independence is an area of notable weakness:  The boards of most Brazilian 
private firms are comprised entirely or almost entirely of insiders or representatives of the 
controlling family or group.  Many firms have zero independent directors.  At the same 
time, minority shareholder have legal rights to representation on the boards of many firms, 
and this representation is reasonably common. 
Financial disclosure lags behind world standards.  Brazilian accounting standard do 
not require either a statement of cash flows or quarterly consolidated financial statements, 
and only a minority of firms provide these, generally in connection with a listing on 
Bovespa Level 1 or higher, or cross-listing on a foreign exchange.  However, about half of 
the respondents provide English language financial statements and an English language 
version of their website. 
Audit committees are uncommon.  However, many Brazilian firms use an alternate 
approach to ensuring financial statement accuracy of a fiscal board.  Most firms have either 
an audit committee or a permanent or effectively permanent fiscal board.  The relative 
advantages of audit committee versus fiscal board, and whether it makes sense to have both 
require further study. 
A high percentage of Brazilian private firms (74 firms, 84%) have issued nonvoting 
preferred shares, as a way for controllers to raise equity capital without diluting their voting 
control.   
Brazilian law requires takeout rights for minority common shareholders at 80% of 
the price paid for controlling shares.  A minority of firms go beyond this legal minimum 
                                                 
76  IBGC Code of Best Practice of Corporate Governance (2003) §§ 2.21 (director compensation; 3.9 
(executive compensation); 3.5.2 (compensation disclosure). 
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and provide takeout rights to minority common shareholders at 100% of the price paid for 
controlling shares, takeout rights for preferred shareholders, or both.  Controlling 
shareholders often use shareholders agreements to ensure control. 
Our survey provides a snapshot of Brazilian governance in 2005.  However, 
governance practices in Brazil are changing rapidly, fueled by new IPOs on Bovespa Level 
2 and Novo Mercado, and to a lesser extent by older public firms upgrading their 
governance.  The number of Level 2 and Novo Mercado firms has grown from 14 at year-
end 2004 (5 of which are in our sample of Brazilian private firms), to 100 at year-end 2007. 
References 
Alexandra, Petra (2007), "Novo Mercado versus Transparency Plus Tier- a Mirror Image," 
Focus Report of Global Corporate Governance Forum, forthcoming, at [url to 
come].  
Ararat, Melsa, and B. Burcin Yurtoglu (2007), "Different Approaches to Differentiating 
'Better Governed' Companies:  Market Segmentation in BOVESPA and Rating 
Based Indexing in ISE, at http://ssrn.com/abstract=989806. 
Baker, Edward, Aron Gottesman, Matthew Morey & Benjamin Godridge (2007), 
"Corporate Governance Ratings in Emerging Markets:  Implications for Market 
Valuation, Internal Firm Performance, Dividend Payouts and Policy", working 
paper, at [not on SSRN yet]. 
Balasubramanian, N., Bernard Black & Vikramaditya Khanna (2007), "Firm-Level 
Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets:  A Case Study of India, working 
paper,, at http://ssrn.com/abstract=995650. 
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, John C. Coates, IV, and Guhan Subramanian (2002), "The powerful 
antitakeover force of staggered boards: theory, evidence, and policy," Stanford Law 
Review 54, 887-951. 
Bennedsen, Morten, Kasper Meisner Nielsen and Thomas Vester Nielsen (2007), "Private 
Contracting and Corporate Governance:  Evidence from the Provision of Tag-Along 
Rights in an Emerging Market", working paper, at [not on SSRN yet]. 
Black, Bernard, Inessa Love & Andrei Rachinsky (2006), "Corporate Governance Indices 
and Firms' Market Values:  Time-Series Evidence from Russia", 7 Emerging 
Markets Review 361-379. 
Bovespa Listing Rules (2006) at http://www.bovespa.com.br/Principal.asp (in Portuguese). 
Brazilian Institute for Corporate Governance (IBGC) (2003), Code of Best Practice of 
Corporate Governance, at 
http://www.ibgc.org.br/ibConteudo.asp?IDp=864&IDArea=945. 
Bruno, Valentina, and Stijn Claessens (2007), Corporate Governance and Regulation:  Can 
There Be Too Much of a Good Thing? (working paper), at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=956329. 
 42
Carvalhal-da-Silva, Andre Luis, and Avanidyar Subramanyam (2007), “Dual-Class 
Premium, Corporate Governance, and the Mandatory Bid Rule: Evidence from the 
Brazilian Stock Market,” 13 Journal of Corporate Finance 1-24. 
Choi, Jongmoo Jay, Sae Won Park, and Sean Sehyun Yoo (2007), “The Value of Outside 
Directors: Evidence from Corporate Governance Reform from Korea,” Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, forthcoming, at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=953732. 
Commissao de Valores Mobiliarios (2002), CVM Recommendations on Corporate 
Governance, available at http://www.cvm.gov.br/ingl/indexing.asp. 
Da Silveira, Alexandre di Miceli, Lucas A. Barros, and Rubens Fama (2004), 
"Determinants of Corporate Governance Quality of Brazilian Listed Companies", 
Fourth Annual Meeting of the Brazilian Finance Society, Rio de Janeiro, available 
at http://www.sbfin.org.br (in Portuguese). 
Da Silveira, Alexandre de Miceli, Ricardo P. C. Leal, Andre Luis Carvalhal-da-Silva, and 
Lucas Ayres B. de C. Barros (2007), "Evolution and Determinants of Firm-Level 
Corporate Governance Quality in Brazil", working paper, at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=995764. 
De Carvalho, Antonio Gledson (2000), “Ascensão e Declínio do Mercado de Capitais no 
Brasil: A Experiência dos Anos 90”, 4 Economia Aplicada 595-632. 
De Carvalho, Antonio Gledson (2002). “Governança Corporativa no Brasil em 
Perspectiva”, 37(3) Revista de Administração 19-32. 
de Carvalho, Antonio Gledson, and George G. Pennacchi (2007), “Can a Stock Exchange 
Improve Corporate Behavior? Evidence From Firm’s Migration to Premium 
Listings in Brazil”, working paper, earlier version at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=678282. 
Drobetz, Wolfgang, Andreas Schillhofer and Heinz Zimmerman (2004), "Corporate 
Governance and Expected Stock Returns:  Evidence from Germany," 10 European 
Financial Management 267-293. 
Dutra, Marcos G. L., and Richard Saito (2002), "Conselhos de Administração: Análise de 
sua Composição em um Conjunto de Companhias Abertas", 6(2) Revista de 
Adminstração Contemporânea 9-27. 
Dyck, Alexander I.J.,, and Luigi Zingales (2004), "Private Benefits of Control:  An 
International Comparison", Journal of Finance 59, 537-600. 
Financial Reporting Council (U.K.), Combined Code of Corporate Governance (2006), at 
http://www.frc.org.uk/corporate/combinedcode.cfm. 
Gorga, Erica (2006), "Culture and Corporate Law Reform:  A Case Study of Brazil," 27 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 803-905, also 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=999942. 
Gorga, Erica (2007), "Changing the Paradigm of Stock Ownership from Concentrated 
Toward Dispersed Ownership:  Evidence From Brazil," working paper, at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=xxxxxx. 
 43
Leal Ricardo P. C. (2007), "Práticas de Governança e Valor Corporativo: uma Recente 
Revisão da Literatura,". In Governança Corporativa, Evidências Empíricas no Brasil 
(São Paulo, Editora Atlas). 
Leal, Ricardo. P., and Andre Luis Carvalhal-da-Silva (2007), "Corporate Governance and 
Value, in Brazil (and in Chile)," in Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio, and Alberto 
Chong, editors, Investor Protection and Corporate Governance – Firm Level 
Evidence Across Latin America xxx-yyy, also available as Inter-American 
Development Bank Research Network Working Paper #R-514 (2005) at 
http://www.iadb.org/res/pub_desc.cfm?pub_id=R-514. 
Leal, Ricardo P. C., Andre Luis Carvalhal-da-Silva and Sylvia Mourthe Valadares (2000), 
"Ownership, Control and Corporate Valuation of Brazilian Companies," 
Proceedings of the Latin American Corporate Governance Roundtable, São Paulo. 
Nenova, Tatiana (2003), "The Value of Corporate Votes and Control Benefits: A Cross-
Country Analysis," 68 Journal of Financial Economics 325-351. 
Nenova, Tatiana (2005), "Control Values and Changes in Corporate Law in Brazil", 6 Latin 
American Business Review 1-37. 
Patel, Sandeep A., Amra Balic and Liliane Bwakira (2002), Measuring Transparency and 
Disclosure at Firm Level in Emerging Markets", working paper, Standard & Poor's. 
Santana, Maria Helena (2007), "Case study on the Novo Mercado (NM) of Sao Paolo Stock 
Exchange (BOVESPA)," Focus Report of Global Corporate Governance Forum, 
forthcoming, at [url to come]. 
Valadares, Sylvia Mourthe (2002), “Estimativa de Valor de Controle no Brasil”, in Marco 
Bonomo editor, Finanças Aplicadas ao Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Editora 
Fundacao Getulio Vargas). 
Valadares, Sylvia Mourthe, and Ricardo P. C. Leal. (2000), “Ownership and Control 
Structure of Brazilian Companies” 3(1) Abante 29-56, at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=213409. 
Zheka, Vitaly (2007), "Does Corporate Governance Causally Predict Firm Performance?  
Panel Data and Instrumental Variables Evidence" (working paper), at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=877913. 
 
 44
Appendix Bovespa listing levels and disclosure and governance requirements 
Main aspects of Bovespa Listing Levels (X = required) Regular Level 1 Level 2 Novo Mercado 
Disclosure requirements 
Agreements between company and related parties. no X X X 
Transactions in company by employees, directors, fiscal board members. no X X X 
Shares held by controllers, directors, and members of the fiscal board. no X X X 
Securities issued by the company. no X X X 
Statement of cash flows. no X X X 
Consolidated quarterly financial statements (if firm provides consolidated annual statements). no X X X 
Financial statements which comply with US GAAP or IFRS, note reconciling these to Brazilian statements. no no X X 
English language financial statements no no X X 
Meetings with analysts (at least annually) no X X X 
Annual calendar of corporate events no X X X 
Only common shares allowed no no no X 
Free-float of at least 25% of outstanding shares no X X X 
Board of Directors  
Minimum number or percentage of independent directors required no no 20% 20% 
Non-staggered board terms, maximum two years no no X X 
Corporate rules 
Preferred shares vote together with common shareholders on selected issues (including mergers spin-offs, contracts 
between the company and related firms). no no X not relevant 
Freezeout offer based on economic value of firm, determined by independent valuation no no X X 
Minority common shareholders have tag-along rights on sale of control, at 100% of price paid for controlling shares. no no X X 
Preferred shareholders have tag-along rights on sale of control, at at least 80% of the price paid for controlling shares. no no X not relevant 
Disputes with shareholders submitted to arbitration. no no X X 
 
